Petition of State of New Hampshire, 103 A.3d 227

Background

Four respondents (Dingman, Lopez, Soto, Tulloch) were convicted of first-degree murder for crimes committed at age 17 and received statutorily mandated life without parole sentences under RSA 630:1-a, III.
Their convictions were final when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama (2012), which held that mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment and requires sentencers to consider youth and mitigating circumstances.
After Miller, each respondent sought collateral relief in Superior Court arguing Miller should apply retroactively and entitle them to new sentencing hearings; the trial court agreed.
The State petitioned this Court for review of whether Miller applies retroactively on collateral review under federal retroactivity doctrine (Teague framework).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed whether Miller announced a substantive rule (retroactive) or a procedural rule (generally nonretroactive), and whether any Teague exception applied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Respondents)	Held
Whether Miller announced a new rule	Miller is procedural: it mandates a sentencing process (a hearing), not a change in permissible punishments	Miller is substantive: it forbids mandatory LWOP for juveniles and changes the range of permissible punishment	Miller announces a new substantive rule and thus can be retroactive
Whether a new substantive rule is required for collateral retroactivity under Teague	Teague: only substantive rules or watershed procedural rules apply retroactively; Miller is not substantive	Miller fits Teague's substantive exception because it alters punishable class/outcomes for juveniles	Miller falls within Teague's substantive exception and is retroactive
Effect of Miller having been applied to a collateral petitioner (Jackson) in the Supreme Court	State argues Tyler limits retroactivity absent explicit holding that a new rule is retroactive	Respondents note Miller reversed the denial of habeas relief for Jackson (a collateral case), supporting retroactivity	Court finds Jackson's presence in Miller supports retroactivity; Tyler statutory analysis not controlling here
Whether Miller completely barred LWOP for juveniles	State: Miller did not categorically bar LWOP, so it is procedural	Respondents: Miller foreclosed mandatory LWOP and required consideration of youth, effectively changing permissible sentencing outcomes	Court: Although Miller does not categorically ban LWOP, it prohibits mandatory LWOP for juveniles and thus substantively altered sentencing law

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth/mitigation)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules on collateral review)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishing substantive rules from procedural rules for retroactivity)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (allocation of factfinding to jury is procedural; discussed in Schriro)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles; juveniles are constitutionally different)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenders categorical bar under Eighth Amendment)
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (struck down mandatory death penalty; individualized sentencing required)
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (discusses Teague rule that new rules generally apply only on direct review)
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Teague exceptions noted: substantive rules and watershed procedural rules)