Peterson v. Jasmanka, 2014 ND 40

In 1952 and 1959 Lester Jasmanka reserved/mined mineral interests and recorded deeds/leases listing a Modoc Avenue address in Richmond, CA (5506 in 1952; 5505 in 1959).
By 1990 surface owners Jack and Eugene Peterson published a statutory "notice of lapse" of mineral interest and mailed the notice to 5505 Modoc Avenue; they then sued to quiet title, serving Jasmanka by publication and mail to that address.
No appearance was made and a default judgment quieting title to the minerals in the Petersons was entered on September 20, 1990.
Jasmanka had died in 1963; his will eventually (by residuary clause) purportedly passed the mineral interest to Hanna Boys Center (HBC). In 2011 Monica Clark became the personal representative of Jasmanka’s estate in Mountrail County.
In 2012 Clark moved to vacate the 1990 default judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) (void for lack of jurisdiction due to defective statutory notice) and 60(b)(3) (fraud/misrepresentation that 5505 was the only address). The district court denied relief; the Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Peterson)	Defendant's Argument (Clark)	Held
Whether failure to strictly comply with N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06(2) mailing requirement makes a subsequent quiet-title judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction.	Service in the quiet-title action complied with N.D.R.Civ.P. 4; the abandoned-minerals mailing is a separate statutory procedure and not jurisdictional.	Failure to mail to the correct address under the abandoned-minerals statute meant jurisdiction was lacking and the 1990 judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4).	The statute’s notice is a substantive prerequisite to acquiring title, not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a district-court action; personal jurisdiction is governed by Rule 4. Judgment not void; 60(b)(4) relief denied.
Whether the 60(b)(3) fraud/misrepresentation claim is timely.	The one-year limitation for motions under Rule 60(b)(3) for default judgments runs from the date the default judgment was entered (Sept. 20, 1990), so Clark’s 2012 motion is untimely.	The one-year period was tolled because notice of entry of judgment was mailed to the wrong address (5505 vs. 5506), so the limitations period never began.	For default judgments the one-year period begins on entry of judgment; alleged defective service of notice of entry is irrelevant. Clark’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion was untimely.

Burgard v. Burgard, 827 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 2013) (Rule 60(b) is exclusive means to reopen default judgment)
Flemming v. Flemming, 790 N.W.2d 762 (N.D. 2010) (Rule 60(b) governs relief from judgment)
Shull v. Walcker, 770 N.W.2d 274 (N.D. 2009) (same)
Eggl v. Fleetguard, Inc., 583 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1998) (standard: if judgment is void court must vacate; review is plenary)
State ex rel. Schlecht v. Wolff, 801 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 2011) (no discretion under Rule 60(b)(4) if judgment is void)
Valley Honey Co., LLC v. Graves, 666 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 2003) (same)
Johnson v. Taliaferro, 793 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 2011) (abandoned-minerals statute vests title when statutory procedure is completed)
Halvorson v. Starr, 785 N.W.2d 248 (N.D. 2010) (mailing under abandoned-minerals statute is not part of district-court procedure)
Spring Creek Ranch, LLC v. Svenberg, 595 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1999) (comparison of "reasonable inquiry" standards)
Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Lang, 221 N.W.2d 719 (N.D. 1974) (statutory notice as part of judicial procedure can be jurisdictional)
Burris Carpet Plus, Inc. v. Burris, 785 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 2010) (standard for finding an appeal frivolous)