Petersen v. Utah Labor Comm'n
416 P.3d 583
Utah2017Background
- In 1982 Steven Petersen sustained a workplace back injury while employed by Granite School District; he received surgeries and workers' compensation benefits intermittently over ensuing decades.
- In 2014 Petersen underwent another back surgery; an impartial medical panel concluded the 1982 injury medically caused the 2014 surgery.
- Granite refused to pay temporary total disability (TTD) compensation after the 2014 surgery on the ground that Utah Code § 35-1-65 bars TTD benefits more than eight years from the date of injury; an ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Board affirmed.
- Petersen petitioned this Court arguing § 35-1-65 is an unconstitutional statute of repose under the Utah Constitution’s Open Courts Clause because it cuts off TTD rights before they accrued.
- The Court considered (1) whether § 35-1-65 is a statute of limitation or repose, (2) whether it abrogates a previously existing remedy, and (3) whether the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) provides an adequate substitute for the abrogated common-law tort remedy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is § 35-1-65 a statute of limitation (runs from accrual) or a statute of repose (runs from some other event)? | Petersen: statute of repose that cuts off compensation rights before TTD accrued. | Granite: cause of action accrues at accident date, so the statute is a limitation running from accrual. | Court: Not a statute of limitation. TTD accrues when employee becomes temporarily totally disabled; § 35-1-65 runs from accident date and thus is not a limitations statute. |
| Does § 35-1-65 violate the Open Courts Clause by abrogating a previously existing remedy? | Petersen: the eight‑year cutoff prevented his TTD right from vesting and therefore unconstitutionally abrogates a remedy. | Granite: § 35-1-65 created a time‑limited statutory right in the WCA; no preexisting right to unlimited lifetime TTD was abrogated. | Court: § 35-1-65 does not cut off any remedy that previously existed; it created a time‑limited statutory benefit and therefore does not trigger Open Courts scrutiny on that basis. |
| If abrogation occurred, is the WCA an adequate substitute for the abrogated common‑law tort remedy? | Petersen (implied): WCA, including § 35-1-65, is inadequate because it limits duration and may undercompensate compared to tort awards. | Granite: The WCA is a no‑fault, comprehensive package (TTD, medical for life, permanent disability benefits) that serves as the quid pro quo for abrogating tort claims. | Court: The WCA as a whole is an effective and reasonable substitute for the pre‑WCA tort remedies; adequacy test satisfied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1997) (applies law as of time of injury for workers' compensation claims)
- Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (Open Courts Clause analysis and test for legislative abrogation of remedies)
- Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989) (statute of repose struck down where it cut off previously existing remedies)
- Masich v. U.S. Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948) (upholding constitutionality of compensation acts as quid pro quo)
- Employers' Reinsurance Fund v. Labor Comm'n, 289 P.3d 572 (Utah 2012) (standards for judicial review of administrative agency action)