Petersen Ex Rel. L.P. v. Lewis County
697 F. App'x 490
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Steven Petersen sued Lewis County and Deputy Matthew McKnight under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after McKnight shot Petersen’s son; appeal followed grant of summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds.
- At the encounter, Petersen’s son matched a description of a person in the area who might be armed with a knife; Petersen allegedly refused commands and began to charge McKnight.
- District court granted summary judgment for McKnight (qualified immunity) and for the County on Monell and related state-law claims; case was appealed to Ninth Circuit and considered on remand from the Supreme Court.
- Ninth Circuit reviewed summary judgment de novo and found no excessive force violation based on the facts known to McKnight when he shot.
- Court held that even if force were unreasonable, Petersen failed to identify clearly established law that would have put McKnight on notice his use of force was unlawful.
- Court also affirmed summary judgment on municipal liability, substantive due process, state-law negligence, vicarious liability, and failure-to-train/supervision claims for lack of evidence of policy/ deliberate indifference or actions outside scope of employment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force / qualified immunity | McKnight used unreasonable, deadly force in shooting Petersen’s son | McKnight reasonably used force because suspect refused orders, charged, and might be armed | Trial court erred in finding material dispute; Ninth Circuit finds force reasonable and grants qualified immunity |
| Clearly established law standard | Existing law put officer on notice his conduct was unlawful under these facts | No controlling precedent clearly established unlawfulness in similar facts | Court: plaintiff failed to identify clearly established law; qualified immunity applies |
| Municipal liability (Monell) | County policies/training caused the shooting | No policy or practice was the moving force; no deliberate indifference in training shown | Summary judgment for County affirmed; plaintiff failed to show policy causation or deliberate indifference |
| Substantive due process | McKnight’s actions shock the conscience and violate due process | Actions did not shock the conscience given split‑second danger | Court: no conscience‑shocking behavior; claim fails |
| State-law negligence / vicarious liability / negligent training | State tort claims arise from unreasonable use of force and inadequate training/supervision | Officer acted reasonably in performance of duties; no evidence employee acted outside scope | Summary judgment for McKnight and County affirmed on state-law grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (clearly established law not defined at high level of generality)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom as moving force)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (failure to train must show deliberate indifference)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (standards for municipal liability for failure to train)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (substantive due process requires conduct that shocks the conscience)
- Gallegos v. Freeman, 291 P.3d 265 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (Washington officer qualified immunity analysis for reasonableness and statutory duty)