Petersen Ex Rel. L.P. v. Lewis County
694 F. App'x 474
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Steven Petersen sued Lewis County and Deputy Matthew McKnight under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after McKnight shot Petersen’s son; case reached Ninth Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court.
- The district court granted summary judgment for McKnight (qualified immunity) and for the County on Monell and related federal claims; also granted summary judgment on some Washington state-law claims.
- The Ninth Circuit found genuine factual disputes about the reasonableness of McKnight’s use of force (excessive force question) that should go to a jury.
- Even assuming McKnight’s conduct was unreasonable, the court held Petersen failed to identify clearly established law that would have put McKnight on notice his conduct was unlawful, so qualified immunity on the § 1983 excessive force claim was proper.
- The court affirmed summary judgment for the County on municipal liability (no policy or deliberate-indifference training evidence) and on the substantive due process claim (no conscience-shocking conduct).
- The court reversed summary judgment on Washington state-law negligence and vicarious liability claims, holding reasonableness is a jury issue and the public-duty doctrine does not bar suit when officers act but must act reasonably; affirmed dismissal of negligent hiring/training/supervision claims as improper where employer concedes actions occurred within scope.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McKnight used excessive force under § 1983 | Petersen: force was unreasonable and unconstitutional | McKnight: force was reasonable and/or he is entitled to qualified immunity | Court: factual dispute on reasonableness, but qualified immunity affirmed—no clearly established law on these facts |
| Municipal liability (Monell) | County’s policies/training caused the violation | County: no policy or training deficiency caused the shooting | Court: summary judgment for County affirmed—no moving-force policy or deliberate indifference shown |
| Substantive due process (shock-the-conscience) | Petersen: conduct violated substantive due process | Defendants: conduct did not shock the conscience | Court: summary judgment for defendants affirmed—no conscience-shocking conduct shown |
| State-law negligence (officer) | Petersen: McKnight acted negligently; reasonableness is disputed | Defendants: public-duty doctrine bars or officer entitled to immunity | Court: reversed summary judgment—reasonableness is for a jury; public-duty doctrine does not bar when officers act but must act reasonably |
| Vicarious liability & negligent training/supervision (County) | County liable vicariously and for negligent training/supervision | County: no liability; training claims improper if actions occurred within scope | Court: reversed vicarious-liability dismissal (may be liable); affirmed dismissal of negligent training/supervision claims because actions occurred within scope |
Key Cases Cited
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (reiterating that clearly established law must be defined narrowly)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires a policy or custom as moving force)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (municipal liability for failure to train requires deliberate indifference)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (standards for failure-to-train municipal liability)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (substantive due process "shock the conscience" standard)
- Gallegos v. Freeman, 291 P.3d 265 (Wash. Ct. App. on officer qualified immunity and reasonableness)
- Coffel v. Clallam Cty., 735 P.2d 686 (public duty doctrine does not absolve officers of duty to act reasonably once they act)
- LaPlant v. Snohomish Cty., 271 P.3d 254 (Washington law on vicarious liability of counties)