Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832

Background

Keith Peters was resentenced in 2011 to 99 years for multiple armed robberies stemming from a 1989 crime spree, after Graham v. Florida narrowed life-without-parole eligibility for juveniles.
The 1991 sentencing had Judge Walsh impose life plus two 99-year terms and other consecutive sentences, with a stated intent to keep Peters incarcerated for life.
In 2009–2010 the scoresheet treated Indian River County offenses as prior record; a later recusal led to resentencing before Judge McCann, who considered out-of-sequence offenses.
The State urged an upward departure using out-of-sequence convictions, including unscorable offenses, and suggested ninety-nine-year terms could be concurrent with life without parole posture.
Defense argued the successor judge must exercise independent judgment; Peters contended the new judge improperly relied on Walsh’s prior findings and ignored rehabilitation.
The circuit ultimately held that the 99-year sentence could be justified under 1989 guidelines as an upward departure and that Graham’s limits did not render the sentence unconstitutional, but remanded for resentencing due to identified anomalies in the scoring.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the resentencing independent and not a rubber stamp?	Peters argues McCann abdicated to Walsh’s findings without independent analysis.	State contends McCann reviewed the record and conducted an evidentiary hearing, forming independent judgment.	No reversible error; McCann’s independent consideration warranted.
May an upward departure rely on out-of-sequence or unscorable convictions?	Peters contends using unscorable/out-of-sequence offenses violates Rousseau and double-counts factors.	State contends departures may include out-of-sequence offenses to address anomaly and still be valid.	Upward departure permissible where unscorable factors justify departure; error not vacated for this ground.
Did considering an uncharged or dropped charge (second-degree murder nolle prosse) affect the sentence improperly?	Peters argues reliance on dropped charges taints sentencing; violates Jansson/Dowling framework.	State argues nolle prosse is not an acquittal and may be considered with defendant’s explanations.	Sentence conformed to Dowling/Jansson framework; no reversible error.
Did the court illegally consider post-incident prison conduct or remorse in imposing sentence?	Peters alleges improper reliance on unsubstantiated conduct claims and lack of remorse in sentencing.	State contends rehabilitation and relevant conduct post-incarceration may be considered to assess rehabilitation.	Court properly considered rehabilitation and relevant conduct in the totality of circumstances.
Does Graham render the 99-year, non-life sentence unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment restraint on juvenile non-homicide offenses?	Peters argues de facto life sentence for a non-homicide juvenile is unconstitutional as applied.	State argues Graham applies to life-without-parole, not de facto life via lengthy term-of-years; Eighth Amendment not violated.	Graham applies to actual life-without-parole; substantial Eighth Amendment concerns acknowledged, but remand for resentencing required due to anomaly.

Key Cases Cited

St. Lawrence v. State, 785 So.2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (de novo sentencing rights and independence of successor judge)
Spencer v. State, 611 So.2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (successor judge must independently evaluate; not merely adopt prior judge)
Moore v. State, 378 So.2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (requirement of independent judgment by successor sentencing judge)
Ross v. State, 958 So.2d 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (independent-sentence standard; familiarity with record supports independence)
Harris v. State, 685 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1996) (out-of-sequence offenses may be considered to avoid windfall; treat unscorable convictions as scorable)
Dowling v. State, 829 So.2d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (admissible consideration of dismissed charges if supported by record)
Jansson v. State, 399 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (prior arrests not leading to convictions can be considered with opportunity to explain)
Smith v. State, 536 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1988) (equity in scoresheet not to include subsequent convictions not scored originally)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juvenile non-homicide life-without-parole ban; limits on punishment)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be jury-tried)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (statutory maximum from jury verdict or admitted facts)
Howard v. State, 820 So.2d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (courts may consider prior arrests not leading to convictions with caveats)
Wiley v. State, 2013 WL 692412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (draws on Graham proportionality in non-death contexts)