50 N.E.3d 827
Mass.2016Background
- Peterborough Oil owned and operated a gasoline station in Athol (within a Zone II public water supply protection area); a 1994 release of leaded gasoline contaminated site soils and triggered DEP-ordered remediation.
- DEP's Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP) implements G. L. c. 21E and contains an "oil exemption" (310 C.M.R. § 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a)) that may lessen remediation requirements for contamination "limited to oil" near public water supplies when other conditions are met.
- In 2008 Peterborough submitted a revised remediation plan asserting the spilled leaded gasoline fell entirely within the MCP/act definition of "oil" and thus qualified for the oil exemption; DEP rejected this, treating "oil" in the exemption as limited to petroleum hydrocarbons and excluding gasoline additives such as lead.
- DEP based its interpretation on scientific studies showing petroleum hydrocarbons tend to biodegrade and not migrate to public water supplies, and on the MCP's focus on chemical-specific risk assessments; DEP also explained the exemption was not intended to include additives.
- Peterborough sued for declaratory and injunctive relief; the Superior Court granted summary judgment to DEP (concluding DEP's interpretation reasonable). The SJC granted direct appellate review and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "oil" in the MCP oil exemption includes leaded gasoline additives (e.g., lead) such that the exemption bars further remediation | Peterborough: statutory definition of "oil" in G. L. c. 21E broadly covers fuel oils like gasoline, so leaded gasoline falls within the exemption | DEP: oil exemption was meant to cover petroleum hydrocarbons only; hazardous additives (like lead) are excluded and must be remediated because they pose distinct risks | Held: DEP's interpretation reasonable; "oil" for the exemption is limited to petroleum hydrocarbons and does not include gasoline additives such as lead |
| Whether the act unambiguously incorporates CERCLA's petroleum exclusion so that leaded gasoline would be treated as oil | Peterborough: CERCLA treats petroleum products as excluded from hazardous substance lists; thus the act's reference to CERCLA implies leaded gasoline is within "oil" | DEP: act's definition does not incorporate CERCLA's petroleum exclusion; act excludes CERCLA-listed hazardous substances (like lead) from "oil" and aims for broader cleanup than CERCLA | Held: Statute ambiguous; court rejects argument that act plainly incorporates CERCLA's petroleum exclusion |
| Whether agency interpretation of its regulation should be disturbed | Peterborough: DEP's narrower reading is inconsistent with some other MCP usages and with the statutory definition of "oil" | DEP: its technical, narrow interpretation aligns with the MCP's chemical-specific risk scheme and its regulatory history and studies | Held: Agency interpretation upheld; courts defer where interpretation is reasonable and not arbitrary |
| Whether declaratory relief was appropriate absent final agency action | Peterborough: sought declaration challenging DEP interpretation to avoid ongoing remediation obligations | DEP: (implicitly) action was ripe because DEP had audited, issued a notice, and denied reconsideration | Held: Actual controversy existed; declaratory relief appropriate because material facts undisputed and challenge was legal |
Key Cases Cited
- Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 459 Mass. 319 (discussing statutory interpretation and legislative purpose)
- Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478 (standard of de novo review for statutory meaning)
- Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627 (plain language controls; ambiguity calls for inquiry into purpose)
- Box Pond Ass'n v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 435 Mass. 408 (agency interpretation upheld unless patently wrong or arbitrary)
- Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526 (statutory construction should not frustrate legislative purpose)