Peter Wenk v. Edward O'Reilly
783 F.3d 585
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Wenks allege their intellectually-disabled daughter M.W. was in the Grandview Heights SD with an IEP under IDEA; Schott became Director of Pupil Services and faced advocacy from the Wenks for M.W.’s social opportunities.
- Wenk advocacy focused on including more social opportunities for M.W., including a proposed special ed prom, during the 2011–2012 school year.
- Hayes and Sidon provided notes about M.W.’s statements and behaviors; Schott relied on those notes to prepare a report.
- Schott reported to Franklin County Children Services (FCCS) on November 18, 2011, containing several allegations, some uncontested and some disputed.
- FCCS found the child-abuse allegations unsubstantiated in January 2012, and police investigation was dropped; the Wenks sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 seeking damages.
- The district court denied summary judgment on qualified immunity, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding a First Amendment retaliation claim was viable and that Schott was not entitled to qualified immunity on those facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Schott’s FCCS report constitutes adverse action. | Wenks: report chills protected speech. | Schott: report based on mandatory duty shows no adverse action. | Yes; a child-abuse report can be adverse action even if some allegations have support. |
| Whether the Wenks showed causation from protected conduct to the report. | Wenks: report motivated by advocacy for M.W.’s IEP. | Schott: reporting occurred due to duty, not retaliation. | Yes; evidence supports retaliatory motive influencing the report. |
| Whether the right to be free from retaliation for First Amendment activity was clearly established. | Wenks: this right was clearly established. | Schott: Ohio mandatory reporting law immunizes conduct. | Right was clearly established; a reasonable official would understand the violation. |
| Whether Schott is entitled to qualified immunity based on the above. | Wenks: right was clearly established; immunity not warranted. | Schott: immunity defenses apply to duties under state law. | No; qualified immunity rejected on the stated facts. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local School District, 513 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2008) (adverse action includes false reports that chill protected speech; not limited to falsehoods)
- A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby County Board of Education, 711 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2013) (adverse action can include reporting of abuse even with some true allegations)
- Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2012) (prima facie elements of retaliation; burden-shifting framework)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (S. Ct. 2014) (two-step clearly established law framework for qualified immunity)
- Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (grounds actually relied upon, not those that might be relied upon by others)
