Peter Waldburger v. CTS Corporation
723 F.3d 434
4th Cir.2013Background
- From 1959–1985 CTS operated an electroplating facility in Asheville that used and stored hazardous solvents (TCE, DCE, heavy metals); contamination was later discovered in nearby private wells.
- David Bradley, Renee Richardson, and 23 other landowners sued CTS in state court asserting nuisance and property-damage claims based on exposure to the contamination; suit filed in 2011.
- North Carolina law contains a three-year statute of limitations for personal-injury/property-damage claims with a discovery rule, and a separate ten-year provision (§ 1-52(16)) that bars real-property claims more than ten years after the defendant’s last act (a statute of repose effect).
- CTS moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the North Carolina ten-year bar precluded the suit because CTS’s last act occurred in 1987; the district court granted dismissal.
- Plaintiffs argued 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (CERCLA § 113(g) amendments) preempts state law by requiring the limitations period to commence when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the injury and its cause (the “federally required commencement date”).
- The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding § 9658’s discovery-based commencement date preempts North Carolina’s ten-year accrual limit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 42 U.S.C. § 9658 preempts a state statute of repose (NC § 1‑52(16) ten‑year accrual bar) | § 9658’s “federally required commencement date” applies whenever a state limitations period begins earlier than that date, so it preempts NC’s ten‑year bar that runs from defendant’s last act | § 9658 refers only to “statute[s] of limitations,” not statutes of repose, so it does not reach NC’s ten‑year rule; thus the repose bars the claim | The court held § 9658 preempts NC’s ten‑year accrual bar; the federal discovery/causation commencement date governs (reversed and remanded) |
| Whether the text of § 9658 is plain or ambiguous as to coverage of repose | The term “statute of limitations” can reasonably be read to include state time bars located in statutory limitations sections (including those with repose effect); historical usage blurred the terms | The statutory text is plain: § 9658 expressly targets statutes of limitations (and its definitions reference statute of limitations), so it should not be read to displace substantive repose rules | The court concluded the text is ambiguous and, in light of CERCLA’s remedial purpose and legislative history, construed § 9658 to cover the NC ten‑year bar |
| Role of remedial purpose and legislative history in construction | CERCLA is remedial; Congress enacted § 9658 to remove procedural barriers (including statutes of repose that defeat latent‑injury claims), so liberal construction favors applying § 9658 to repose that functionally operate like limitations | Even given remedial purpose, plain language and the study group's distinctions counsel against extending § 9658 to substantive repose; presumption against preemption applies | The majority applied remedial‑construction principles and legislative purpose to support preemption of the NC ten‑year bar |
| Effect of decision on defendants’ repose interests and litigation policy | Plaintiffs will be allowed to sue latent‑injury claims despite state repose; but plaintiffs still must meet discovery window and state three‑year discovery limit, and proof issues may limit recovery | Extending § 9658 undermines repose policies (finality, evidence preservation) and removes substantive state‑law immunity | Court acknowledged repose policies but held § 9658’s remedial aims outweigh them here; procedural discovery rule displaces the state accrual rule but does not erase evidentiary or merits burdens |
Key Cases Cited
- Lambeth v. Bd. of Commis., 407 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2005) (standard of review on Rule 12(b)(6) and accepting complaint facts as true)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (overview of CERCLA’s remedial purpose)
- First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing statutes of limitations from statutes of repose)
- McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding § 9658 can encompass statutes of repose under § 9658’s ambiguity and purpose)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2005) (contrasting view: § 9658 did not apply where plaintiff discovered claim before repose expired)
- Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing CERCLA remedial aims and cost‑shifting to responsible parties)