Peter Nelson v. Town of Paris, 78 F.4th 389

Town of Paris (Wis.) ordinance (2008, amended 2018) bars "designated offenders" from residing within 6,500 feet of certain "Protected Locations" (schools, parks, etc.) and from residing within 6,500 feet of another designated offender; ordinance states a civil, child‑protection purpose.
Violations subject to a $500 daily fine; the ordinance contains a nonretroactivity exception for already‑established residences when a new Protected Location opens.
Peter Nelson, a registered sex offender, lived at the Bristol Motel (long‑term rental) which was not within 6,500 feet of a Protected Location but was within 6,500 feet of another designated offender; his appeal for an exemption was denied and he received a citation; he moved out of Paris.
Paris’s three multi‑unit long‑term rentals are effectively restricted by the ordinance; combined effects initially put a large portion of Paris’s land and housing off‑limits to designated offenders and occupancy by one offender creates new exclusion zones.
District court granted summary judgment to Paris on Nelson’s § 1983 claims (Ex Post Facto and substantive due process). Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the Protected Locations restriction and due process, but vacated/remanded as to the "designated offenders" restriction for further factual development.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 6,500‑ft Protected Locations restriction is punitive in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause	Nelson: 6,500 ft is excessive, retroactive and punitive	Paris: civil, regulatory scheme to protect children; rationally related to that goal	Not punitive; the restriction is civil and does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause (affirmed)
Whether the 6,500‑ft restriction between designated offenders is punitive (Ex Post Facto)	Nelson: resembles banishment, effectively prevents offenders from living in town and is excessive/no record support	Paris: legitimate civil purpose to limit proximity and interaction among offenders; ordinance is nonpunitive on its face	Genuine factual disputes exist about excessiveness/reasonableness; summary judgment for Paris on this restriction vacated and remanded for evidentiary development
Whether the ordinance violates substantive due process	Nelson: ordinance infringes liberty interests and should receive heightened review (claims sex offenders are a despised class)	Paris: ordinance is facially neutral and rationally related to protecting children	Rational‑basis review applies; Nelson conceded rational relation, so due process claim fails (affirmed)

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (framework for determining when civil regulatory schemes are punitive under the Ex Post Facto Clause)
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (distinguishing civil regulation from criminal punishment)
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (rejecting as‑applied test for whether a statutory scheme is punitive)
Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513 (7th Cir.) (upholding residency restriction analysis and applying Smith factors)
Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.) (upholding shorter buffer and rejecting banishment theory)
Koch v. Village of Hartland, 43 F.4th 747 (7th Cir.) (retroactivity analysis for residency restrictions)
Doe v. Miami‑Dade County, 846 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir.) (considering whether residency rules impose affirmative disabilities)
Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir.) (treating residency/registration restraints as punitive in certain contexts)
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir.) (upholding larger buffer distance against Ex Post Facto challenge)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180 (legislative deference to regulatory judgments; remand for factual development where record is sparse)