Peter M. Beckerman v. Bruce Pooler, 119 A.3d 74

Beckerman owns a waterfront parcel with vehicle access only via driveways on adjacent lots; Poolers and Conant/Pooler titles intertwine such that access rights were contested.
In 2000 Beckerman sued the Poolers and others to resolve boundary/access issues; the complaint did not assert a right to cross the Conants’ (then Pooler’s) driveway.
A 2002 consent order required the Poolers to grant Beckerman an easement over the Poolers’ driveway and stated it would not limit any “deeded right-of-way in favor of the Beckerman lot across [the Conants’] lot,” without otherwise addressing use of the Conants’ driveway.
In 2012 Beckerman filed a contempt motion against the Conants (successors to Rodney Pooler) alleging they blocked his access in violation of the consent order; he separately filed a declaratory-judgment action asserting a deeded and prescriptive easement over the Conants’ driveway.
After a two-day hearing the Superior Court denied contempt, found the consent order ambiguous and not an affirmative recognition of an easement, and (erroneously, per the Supreme Judicial Court) also adjudicated that Beckerman did not have a deeded easement.
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed denial of contempt but vacated the superior court’s determination on the deeded easement as beyond the contempt motion’s scope and left that claim to the pending declaratory action.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2002 consent order recognized an easement over the Conants’ driveway so as to support contempt for interference	Beckerman: the consent order’s language acknowledging it did not limit a deeded right-of-way across the Conants’ lot is an affirmative recognition of his easement and thus the Conants’ interference violates the order	Conants: the consent order granted an easement only over the Poolers’ lot and merely preserved whatever separate rights Beckerman might have had; it did not impose any duty on Rodney Pooler or his grantees	The court held the consent order was ambiguous and did not clearly recognize or create an enforceable easement over the Conants’ driveway; contempt not proven by clear and convincing evidence
Whether the court, in resolving the contempt motion, properly adjudicated Beckerman’s separate claim that he holds a deeded easement over the Conants’ lot	Beckerman sought relief on the contempt motion and also maintains a separate declaratory action to establish a deeded easement	Conants argued contempt motion did not expand to decide title/easement issues reserved for declaratory action	The court erred in reaching the deeded-easement question during the contempt proceeding; that issue must be resolved in the separate declaratory-judgment action, so the superior court’s decree denying a deeded easement was vacated

Waltz v. Waltz, 58 A.3d 1127 (Me. 2013) (standard of review for civil contempt and evidentiary burden)
Grondin v. Hanscom, 106 A.3d 1150 (Me. 2014) (clear-and-convincing evidence defined)
Handrahan v. Malenko, 12 A.3d 79 (Me. 2011) (appellate standard for contempt findings)
White v. Nason, 874 A.2d 891 (Me. 2005) (orders must state duties in definite terms before contempt)
Banker v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 507 A.2d 602 (Me. 1986) (vacating contempt where original order ambiguous)
Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667 (Me. 1980) (declaratory relief appropriate to quiet title/easement disputes)
Dodge v. Norridgewock, 577 A.2d 346 (Me. 1990) (courts should avoid issuing advisory opinions)
Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d 74 (Me. 1980) (judiciary lacks power to issue advisory rulings)
DiBiase v. Universal Design & Builders, Inc., 473 A.2d 875 (Me. 1984) (parties must consent to litigate issues outside pleadings)