Peter Griffith v. State of Indiana
31 N.E.3d 965
| Ind. | 2015Background
- Peter Griffith was charged with Class C felony battery after stabbing his son‑in‑law, Darren Wiles, during an unprovoked altercation; eyewitnesses testified Griffith was the initial aggressor.
- At trial the defense sought to impeach Darren with two witnesses (Brinson and Kennett) who would testify Darren later told them he had hit Griffith with a two‑by‑four before being stabbed. The defense did not cross‑examine Darren about those statements during his testimony.
- The trial court permitted Brinson and Kennett to testify outside the jury’s presence but (either explicitly or effectively) excluded their extrinsic impeachment testimony from the jury without first giving Darren a chance to explain or deny the alleged prior statements; the defense did not call them once the jury returned.
- Griffith was convicted and sentenced to four years executed; he appealed, arguing exclusion of the impeachment evidence deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to present a defense (self‑defense).
- The Court considered whether Indiana Evidence Rule 613(b) requires a particular sequence (confrontation first) before admitting extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, and whether exclusion here was an abuse of discretion or harmless error.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Griffith's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 613(b) requires a witness be confronted before extrinsic impeachment evidence may be admitted | Rule 613(b) requires the witness be afforded an opportunity to explain or deny, and prior Indiana precedent supported exclusion where no confrontation occurred | Rule 613(b) permits extrinsic impeachment before confrontation so long as the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny at some point | Rule 613(b) does not mandate a sequence; extrinsic evidence may be admitted before or after confrontation, but confronting the witness first is the preferred practice and courts retain broad discretion |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Brinson and Kennett’s testimony | Exclusion was proper because availability of Darren to be recalled was not established, other eyewitnesses corroborated Darren, and defense gave no reason for failing to confront Darren | Testimony was critical to self‑defense and should have been admitted for impeachment under Rule 613(b) | No abuse of discretion; exclusion was proper and, in any event, any error was harmless because the testimony would be only impeachment (not substantive) and self‑defense was not developed at trial |
| Whether exclusion denied Griffith a meaningful opportunity to present a defense | Exclusion did not deny a meaningful opportunity given other evidence and procedural posture | Exclusion prevented admission of crucial impeachment evidence supporting self‑defense | Held for State; conviction and sentence affirmed |
| Whether any error in exclusion was harmless | State: error (if any) was harmless because impeachment only and self‑defense not pursued | Griffith: exclusion prejudiced his defense and was not harmless | Court: any error would be harmless under the circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Hilton v. State, 648 N.E.2d 361 (Ind. 1995) (upheld exclusion where defendant did not cross‑examine witness about alleged prior inconsistent statement)
- U.S. v. Della Rose, 403 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2005) (Rule 613(b) permits extrinsic impeachment before confrontation; witness must be afforded opportunity to explain or deny at some point)
- Orr v. State, 968 N.E.2d 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (endorsing federal approach that timing is not specified and trial courts have discretion)
- Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 793 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1986) (Rule 613(b) modifies traditional sequence; no particular timing required)
- Appleton v. State, 740 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. 2001) (a party cannot call a witness solely to present otherwise inadmissible evidence dressed as impeachment)