Peter G. Milne, P.C., Peter G. Milne, Individually, and Healy, Milne & Associates, P.C. v. Val Ryan and Joy Ryan, 06-14-00106-CV

Appellees Val & Joy Ryan sued Hicks Defendants and others for multiple claims arising from Medicaid planning services and a 2001 injunction from Smith County.
Hicks operated as an independent contractor to Appellants Milne, Milne & Associates, PC and related entities from 2005 to 2012, sharing fees depending on who originated the client.
Appellees sought class certification for 450–575 potential members on unconscionability under the DTPA, breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory relief, and vicarious liability theories.
The district court certified the class for unconscionability and breach of fiduciary duty against Hicks, and for declaratory relief and vicarious liability, while denying certification against Appellants.
The court defined the class as those who paid fees for ‘enjoined services’ by Hicks since January 1, 2005, tying ‘enjoined services’ to the 2001 injunction, which the court treated as a merits issue.
Appellants appealed, arguing the class definition is unascertainable (a fail-safe/class-defining merits), and that the other certifications are improper under Rule 42.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the class definition meets the clearly ascertainable standard.	Milne argues the class is unfixed and relies on merits.	Hicks argues the class is properly defined by enjoined services under the injunction.	Class definition is not clearly ascertainable; fail-safe/class-defining merits invalid.
Whether unconscionability claims against Hicks predominate.	Appellees contend common questions predominate due to shared conduct.	Hicks asserts individualized inquiries predominate given varied knowledge and capacity of members.	Predominance not shown; common issues do not govern all members.
Whether unconscionability and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Hicks are typical of the class.	Appellees claim Hicks’s conduct is representative of class injuries.	Hicks contends Appellees lack contracts with Hicks and injuries differ.	Not typical; Hicks’s claims are not representative of class injuries.
Whether declaratory relief certification is proper when relief is predominantly monetary.	Appellees seek declaratory relief regarding injunction violations.	Hicks argues relief would principally be monetary damages, not declaratory.	Declaratory relief certification improper where relief is primarily monetary.

Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. 2000) (class definitions cannot rest on ultimate liability or merit)
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 S.W.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998) (monetary relief predominates unless incidental to injunctive/declaratory relief)
Peltier Enterprises, Inc. v. Hilton, 51 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App. – Tyler 2000) (unconscionability elements; need for consumer’s possible actions)
Southwest Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000) (predominance inquiry focused on whether common issues predominate)
East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1965) (typicality requires the representative suffer the same injury as class)
Wente v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 712 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App. – Austin 1986) (commonality and predominance standards in Texas class actions)