Peter Daza v. State of Indiana, 941 F.3d 303

Peter Daza, an INDOT geologist/supervisor since 1993, was terminated on December 10, 2015; INDOT cited a pattern of unprofessional behavior culminating in offensive conduct during a December 1 training session.
Prior to termination Daza had intermittent praise for job knowledge but repeated complaints about professionalism and a written reprimand in 2013.
Daza claims his firing was motivated by protected political conduct and affiliation: (1) defending a Democratic supervisee (Goff) in 2011 and 2014, (2) discussing his mother’s critical letter to a newspaper about Governor Pence in late 2015, and (3) his status as a Democrat.
Human Resources and management discussed various incidents (training notes, after-hours phone refusal, emailed bonus notices); Fowler (the decisionmaker) allegedly decided to terminate and—per his declaration—was unaware of the mother’s letter before firing.
Daza sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment political discrimination and retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment to defendants, and Daza appealed only the § 1983 claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Political-discrimination under First Amendment	Daza: management harassed and ultimately fired him for political activity/affiliation (defending Goff; mother’s letter; being a Democrat).	INDOT: termination was for long-standing behavioral issues and specific conduct at training; no nexus to political activity.	Affirmed: Daza failed to show protected activity was a motivating factor.
Political-retaliation under First Amendment	Daza: he was punished for protected speech (defenses of Goff; discussion of mother’s letter); the firing was retaliatory.	INDOT: no causal link; decision based on documented conduct problems.	Affirmed: plaintiff did not show causation; court did not reach whether speech was protected or whether deprivation would deter speech.
Political-affiliation discrimination	Daza: his Democratic affiliation motivated disparate treatment (e.g., hiring of Republican Brink, refusal to permit response before firing).	INDOT: no evidence linking decisions to party affiliation; actions tied to conduct and managerial judgment.	Affirmed: no evidence that affiliation was a motivating factor.

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (public employers may not fire employees for political beliefs or support)
Bisluk v. Hamer, 800 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2015) (prima facie elements for First Amendment political-discrimination claim)
Graber v. Clarke, 763 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2014) (causal-connection requirement for motivating-factor showing)
Hall v. Babb, 389 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2004) (defendant must be aware of protected conduct for causation)
Lalvani v. Cook Cty., 269 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2001) (suspicious timing may support causation only when adverse action closely follows protected conduct)
Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2012) (timing inference typically requires only a few days between acts and adverse action)
Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2005) (other evidence required when timing alone is insufficient to show causation)
Yahnke v. Kane Cty., 823 F.3d 1066 (7th Cir. 2016) (additional element for retaliation: deprivation likely to deter free speech)
Hagan v. Quinn, 867 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2017) (political affiliation is protected under the First Amendment)
Brown v. County of Cook, 661 F.3d 333 (7th Cir. 2011) (evidence must be relevant to whether political affiliation motivated the adverse action)