Peter Brownstein v. Tina Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55

Brownstein and Lindsay co-created the LCID by combining Lindsay's Ethnic Determinant System with Brownstein's ETHN programs; Brownstein authored the code, Lindsay authored the rules, and the two contributed to a joint work.
Lindsay registered copyrights in 1996 for the EDS and then a derivative registration in 1996/1997 that included Brownstein’s code as a deposit copy, listing herself as the sole author.
From 1997 onward, TAP and Ethnic Technologies (E-Tech) were formed to commercialize the LCID; Brownstein held leadership roles but was not a signatory to all relevant licenses.
A sequence of license and settlement agreements (1997 Software License; 1997 Agreement; 2000 Agreement; 1998 LSDI Settlement; 2010 Settlement) created complex ownership and licensing rights among TAP, E-Tech, LSDI, CMR, and others, without clearly transferring Brownstein’s co-authorship rights.
In 2010 Brownstein signed the New Jersey oppressed shareholder settlement, which purported to divest him of certain interests; he then filed this suit in March 2010 seeking a declaratory judgment of joint authorship and related relief.
The District Court granted Rule 50(a) judgment for the Appellees on Brownstein’s joint-authorship claim and later granted summary judgment to cancel Brownstein’s copyright registrations, both of which are reversed on appeal and remanded for trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Brownstein a co-author of the LCID?	Brownstein contributed non-trivial, inseparable code; joint authorship with Lindsay.	E-less; ownership traced through licenses; Brownstein’s rights limited.	Yes; Brownstein was a co-author through 1997; trial needed to determine derivative-works and scope.
When does a joint-authorship claim accrue?	Express repudiation or discovery governs accrual after repudiation is communicated.	Accrual begins at the time of repudiation or discovery as appropriate; the timing matters for statute.	Accrual occurs with express repudiation, with discovery-rule analysis applied only after repudiation.
May a court cancel copyright registrations?	Court authority to cancel may be implied or inferred from statutory structure.	Courts have broad authority to cancel registrations under copyright law.	No; courts have no general authority to cancel copyright registrations; such action lies with the Copyright Office.

Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (express repudiation and accrual of co-authorship claims)
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004) (express repudiation and co-authorship in joint works)
Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2013) (pronounces approach to co-authorship and repudiation)
Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. v. West Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H. & Co. KG., 510 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2007) (express repudiation and accrual context for joint authorship)
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2000) (co-authorship and scope of derivative works discussion)
Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007) (non-exclusive licenses and co-ownership implications)