Peter Akemann v. Patrick J. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803

Dibble and Akemann were Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission arbitrators; Public Act 97-18 (2011) shortened their six-year terms and allowed holdovers until new appointments were made by the Governor.
Acts took effect July 1, 2011, ending incumbents’ terms; by July 1, 2012 both plaintiffs had been removed from their positions.
Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment without due process, naming Governor Quinn and IWCC members as defendants.
The district courts dismissed (Dibble) or granted summary judgment (Akemann); plaintiffs appeal only the property-rights claims, not the liberty-interest claim.
The court held the required property interest existed under prior law until July 1, 2011, but Public Act 97-18 eliminated that interest; the issue is whether due process was satisfied for such legislative modification.
Damages claims are pursued in individual capacities; reinstatement is moot due to term expiration; damages remain for the challenged actions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did plaintiffs have a property interest in six-year terms prior to Act 97-18?	Dibble and Akemann had a protected property interest in six-year terms and could not be deprived without due process.	Legislature validly altered or terminated statutory entitlements; due process is satisfied via legislative process when interests are changed.	Plaintiffs had a property interest prior to 2011, but Act 97-18 ended it lawfully via legislation.
Was the legislative change to the arbitration terms properly cognizable under due process or a pretextual mischaracterization?	Schulz/Misek suggest a pretextual legislative action designed to harm specific employees violates due process.	Legislative change is legislative action, not adjudicative; Atkins/Logan require no procedural hearing for general legislative adjustments.	Legislation ending six-year terms was legislative, not adjudicative, and did not violate clearly established due process.
Was the right at issue clearly established such that officials are not entitled to qualified immunity?	Due process rights against legislatively altering tenure were clearly established and violated by Act 97-18.	There was no clearly established right prohibiting such legislative modification; the action was constitutional.	Defendants entitled to qualified immunity; no clearly established right violated by the legislative termination.

Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985) (legislature may adjust or terminate statutory entitlements; due process satisfied via legislative process)
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (due process in procedural contexts; entitlement context)
Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (property interests defined by independent sources, e.g., state law)
Colburn v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 973 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1992) (guidance on legitimate claim of entitlement and state-law source of interest)
Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1986) (reorganization exception to due process; pretext inquiry discussible but not dispositive here)
Schulz v. Green County, 645 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2011) (discusses pretextual legislative action; not clearly establishing rights here)
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012) (two-step qualified-immunity framework; clearly established inquiry)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (clearly established standard for qualified immunity; specificity required)
City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (clarifies clearly established rights in context-specific queries)
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (limits on motive-based inquiries in legislative actions)
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislative purpose motive considerations generally inappropriate for legislative acts)
Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1995) (legislation altering welfare-type entitlements and due process)