Peter Abatangelo v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA
17-1794
| 7th Cir. | Dec 15, 2017Background
- Abatangelo and Frederick separately lost foreclosure actions in Illinois state court; appellate courts affirmed and state supreme court denied further review.
- Each then filed a joint federal § 1983 suit alleging the Illinois foreclosure-appellate-review regime (735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) and related precedent) denied them equal protection by restricting post-sale appeals of foreclosure judgments.
- Plaintiffs sought to set aside the state-court foreclosure judgments, return their homes, and remand the appeals for further review.
- The district court first dismissed on claim-preclusion grounds, then revised its judgment to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine; it alternatively noted claim preclusion would bar relief.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman and further noted plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims failed for lack of state action by private banks.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal court has jurisdiction when plaintiffs seek to overturn state-court foreclosure judgments | Abatangelo/Frederick say they are raising constitutional equal-protection claims, not asking to reverse state judgments | Defendants say suit effectively seeks review and reversal of state-court judgments, so Rooker–Feldman bars federal jurisdiction | Rooker–Feldman applies; federal courts lack jurisdiction because relief would nullify state-court decisions |
| Whether plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to raise their federal claims in state court (Rooker–Feldman exception) | Plaintiffs claim the constitutional injury only arose with the appellate rulings, so they had no reasonable state-court opportunity | Defendants point to rehearing petitions, petitions for leave to state supreme court, and Rule 317 as available means | Plaintiffs had reasonable opportunity (petition for rehearing, leave to appeal, Rule 317, certiorari); exception doesn’t save them |
| Whether McCluskey (Ill. 2013) prevented plaintiffs from raising scope-of-review arguments in state court | Plaintiffs argue McCluskey was a new rule that caused their inability to appeal as of right | Defendants and court note harm flowed from appellate application of existing statute and that McCluskey’s rule would bind a remanded appellate court anyway | McCluskey does not avoid Rooker–Feldman; plaintiffs could have sought Illinois Supreme Court review or certiorari to U.S. Supreme Court |
| Whether private banks are state actors for § 1983 purposes | Plaintiffs implicitly rely on foreclosure process as state action | Defendants maintain banks are private actors, not state actors | Banks are not state actors here; absence of state action dooms § 1983 claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (original decision establishing that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to act as appellate courts over final state-court judgments)
- D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (limits federal review of state-court adjudications and complements Rooker)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (clarified scope of Rooker–Feldman doctrine)
- Gilbert v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2010) (explains Rooker–Feldman exception for claims not reasonably litigable in state court)
- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey, 999 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. 2013) (Illinois Supreme Court interpreting foreclosure-review limits under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law)
- Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2017) (claims that seek to set aside state-court judgments are de facto appeals under Rooker–Feldman)
- London v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 600 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2010) (private banks are generally not state actors for § 1983 purposes)