Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children v. Vicente T. (In re Isr. T.)
240 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2018Background
- June 2017: Police observed Father exchange money for a Styrofoam cup; Father and Mother were arrested after Mother ingested contents of a cup; officers searched the home and found small baggies with drug residue (one tested .06 g methamphetamine) and marijuana. DCFS detained Israel (5) and Isabel (3) and placed them with paternal relatives.
- Parents denied drug use/sale, claimed drugs were planted or belonged to adult son; son testified marijuana was his and denied seeing parents use drugs.
- Parents cooperated with DCFS, visited daily, assisted with children's care (notably important for Israel, who has autism), and volunteered for services including drug testing and parenting classes; Father tested negative once in July; Mother missed a test.
- At the jurisdictional hearing, counsel for DCFS and children urged jurisdiction under Welf. & Inst. Code § 300(b) based on drugs accessible in the home; parents' counsel sought dismissal and argued evidence of recent negative testing and willingness to test further (court disallowed that as a dispositional matter).
- The juvenile court interlineated the petition, striking the words "substantial" and "serious" from its finding, declared there was a "risk" that the children would suffer physical harm from trace methamphetamine found within their access, but at disposition returned the children to parents under informal supervision (§ 360(b)), saying it did not believe the parents "constitute any kind of risk" to the children.
- The Court of Appeal reversed the jurisdictional finding, holding the court failed to make the statutorily required finding of a "substantial risk of serious physical harm."
Issues
| Issue | Father’s Argument | Respondent’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the juvenile court validly asserted jurisdiction under § 300(b) when it struck "substantial" and "serious" from its finding | The court’s excision of "substantial" and "serious" shows it did not make the required statutory finding; reversal required | Forfeiture and that evidence (drug residue accessible to children) supported jurisdiction regardless of wording | Reversed: court did not make the § 300(b) finding of a substantial risk of serious physical harm; jurisdictional order reversed |
| Whether appellate review may supply omitted statutory findings when record could support them | Court must review the actual findings made; cannot infer required statutory findings when the juvenile court omitted them | Respondent urged that evidence supported required finding so omission harmless | Held against respondent: appellate court will not imply missing statutory findings; the test applies to the court’s actual finding |
| Whether forfeiture bars Father’s claim that required statutory language was omitted | Father preserved challenge to the court’s failure to make required findings (not a petition sufficiency challenge) | Respondent argued forfeiture because no contemporaneous objection | Held: forfeiture inapplicable here; issue is court’s failure to make statutorily required findings, not petition sufficiency |
| Whether dispositional findings rendered jurisdictional wording harmless (compare Alexander C.) | Father: dispositional order and court remarks show court did not find substantial/serious risk | Respondent: Alexander C. shows wording can be harmless when dispositional findings show substantial danger | Held: Distinct from Alexander C.; here dispositional findings and court remarks explicitly negate any finding of substantial risk, so wording was not harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- In re D.L., 22 Cal.App.5th 1142 (evidence of past conduct probative of current substantial risk requirement)
- In re B.T., 193 Cal.App.4th 685 (§ 300(b) requires substantial risk of serious physical harm)
- In re James R., 176 Cal.App.4th 129 (past conduct may bear on present risk)
- In re J.N., 181 Cal.App.4th 1010 (standard of review for jurisdictional findings)
- In re M.R., 7 Cal.App.5th 886 (DCFS burden to prove dependency by preponderance)
- Maggie S. v. Superior Court, 220 Cal.App.4th 662 (section 300(b) "means what it says"—requires substantial risk of serious harm)
- In re Noe F., 213 Cal.App.4th 358 (interpretation of § 300(b) risk requirement)
- In re Alysha S., 51 Cal.App.4th 393 (§ 300(b) risk threshold discussion)
- In re Alexzander C., 18 Cal.App.5th 438 (where dispositional findings showed substantial danger, wording omissions were harmless)
- In re Abram L., 219 Cal.App.4th 452 (appellate court cannot imply required statutory findings)
- In re Adam D., 183 Cal.App.4th 1250 (§ 360(b) informal supervision is an appealable dispositional order and does not dismiss the true finding)