Personal Restraint Petition Of Steven Daniel Kravetz, 49491-4

Background

On March 9, 2012, Steven Kravetz attacked Deputy Polly Davin at the Grays Harbor County Courthouse, wrestled her to the ground, disarmed her, and shot her in the arm; he also stabbed a judge during the incident.
Police arrested Kravetz at his mother’s home the next day; a search of the home (authorized by warrant) recovered a gun, knife, clothes, and documents including a courthouse sketch and a file about Deputy Libby.
Kravetz was tried for multiple offenses; the jury convicted him of first degree assault (against Deputy Davin with a firearm), disarming a law enforcement officer, and second degree assault (against the judge). He was found not guilty of attempted murder.
Mental-health experts diagnosed Kravetz with delusional/paranoid disorders but consistently testified he nonetheless had the capacity to form intent and knew right from wrong; Kravetz admitted he knew his planned conduct would be illegal.
At sentencing, the court imposed an upward exceptional sentence (240 months plus a 60‑month firearm enhancement) for first degree assault, citing the jury’s special-verdict finding that the assault was committed against a law enforcement officer and that Kravetz knew the victim’s status; the court also imposed standard-range sentences on the other convictions.
Kravetz filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to move to suppress, failure to seek a same‑criminal‑conduct finding, failure to raise double‑counting) and sentencing errors (failure to find mitigating mental‑illness factor; improper reliance on future dangerousness). The Court of Appeals denied relief.

Issues

Issue	Kravetz’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
1) Counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress garage documents (sketch, Libby photo)	Documents were outside the warrant’s scope; admission prejudiced his diminished‑capacity defense	Even if counsel erred, other strong evidence (three doctors’ testimony and Kravetz’s own statements) proved capacity to form intent; no prejudice	Denied — no prejudice shown from alleged failure to suppress
2) Counsel ineffective for not asking court to treat disarming and assault as same criminal conduct	Disarming and assault were part of a single intent and continuous act	The acts involved different intents (avoiding being shot vs. later forming intent to shoot); there was time to reflect and form new intent	Denied — crimes did not constitute same criminal conduct; counsel not deficient
3) Counsel ineffective for not arguing double‑counting in support of exceptional sentence	Facts underlying the disarming conviction (officer’s status) were already counted in offender score and thus cannot support an exceptional upward sentence	Aggravating facts used to justify the exceptional sentence were jury findings specific to the first‑degree assault and were not part of the offender‑score calculation for that offense	Denied — aggravators were not double‑counted; counsel not deficient
4) Sentencing court erred by (a) refusing mitigating mental‑illness finding and (b) relying on future dangerousness	(a) Mental illness significantly impaired ability to appreciate wrongfulness; (b) oral comments about future dangerousness improperly supported the upward sentence	Court considered mental‑health evidence and rejected it based on record; written findings relied only on jury’s aggravating findings (not future dangerousness)	Denied — court did not abuse discretion in refusing mitigating factor; written findings did not rely on future dangerousness

Key Cases Cited

State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322 (definition of deficient performance and prejudice for ineffective assistance)
State v. Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531 (narrow construction of same criminal conduct rule)
State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514 (prohibition on using factors already considered in computing standard range to justify exceptional sentence)
State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288 (aggravating reasons for exceptional sentences must account for factors beyond those used to compute standard range)
State v. Pappas, 176 Wn.2d 188 (focus on elements of the offense being sentenced when determining what was accounted for in the standard range)
Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (jury must find facts supporting aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt)