Personal Restraint Petition Of Ronald Sorenson, 48111-1

Background

Ronald Sorenson was convicted of nine counts of child molestation; the Court of Appeals affirmed convictions but remanded to correct scrivener’s errors in the judgment and sentence (dates for counts 2, 3, 9).
The Washington Supreme Court denied review; the Court of Appeals issued its mandate on August 12, 2014.
Trial court signed and filed a ministerial order correcting the judgment and sentence on September 15–16, 2014; Sorenson had filed a waiver of presence for the correction hearing on September 3.
Sorenson filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) on September 15, 2015 — more than one year after the mandate but roughly contemporaneous with the trial court’s filing of the correction order.
The PRP alleged (among other things) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for lack of trial preparedness and failure to retain a memory expert; the Court analyzed timeliness and, in an unpublished portion, the ineffective-assistance claim on the merits.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of PRP	PRP is timely because it was filed within one year of the trial court’s correction of scrivener’s errors	Mandate ended all merits litigation; trial court made only ministerial corrections on remand, so judgment became final on mandate date	PRP is time-barred — judgment became final when mandate issued because remand required no independent trial-court discretion
Effect of waiver of presence	Waiver shows hearing on correction was not ministerial and Sorenson had a right to be present, so finality did not attach earlier	Waiver does not convert a ministerial correction into a discretionary proceeding; no constitutional right to be present for ministerial corrections	Waiver did not make the correction discretionary; correction remained ministerial
Applicability of cases like Skylstad/Contreras-Rebollar	Sorenson relied on those cases to argue finality did not occur at mandate	Distinguishes those cases: in Skylstad/Contreras-Rebollar the sentence was reversed or resentencing was pending, so litigation continued; here sentence was not reversed and no appeal of resentencing was pending	Skylstad and Contreras-Rebollar inapplicable because Sorenson’s sentence was not reversed and no second appeal was pending
Ineffective assistance of counsel	Counsel unprepared; failed to interview witnesses and failed to obtain a memory expert — prejudiced trial outcome	Record shows counsel investigated, interviewed witnesses, made tactical decisions, and no record of funding/order for expert; petitioner failed to provide evidentiary support	On the merits (unpublished): Sorenson failed to overcome presumption of effective assistance; no deficient performance or prejudice shown

Key Cases Cited

In re Pers. Restraint of Skylstad, 160 Wn.2d 944 (holding judgment is not final while litigation on sentence remains pending)
State v. Contreras-Rebollar, 177 Wn.2d 563 (same principle; mandate date cannot be relied on when resentencing appeal remains pending)
State v. Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28 (remand that requires only ministerial correction leaves no appealable issue; judgment final upon mandate)
In re Personal Restraint of Adams, 178 Wn.2d 417 (facial invalidity of a judgment does not excuse the statutory one-year time bar for unrelated claims)
State v. Ramos, 171 Wn.2d 46 (defendant has right to be present when trial court on remand must exercise discretionary sentencing decisions)
State v. Fort, 190 Wn. App. 202 (when remand requires discretionary resentencing and a second appeal is pending, a PRP filed before finality may be timely)
State v. A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d 91 (discusses contexts in which experts or investigations may be relevant to ineffective-assistance claims)