Personal Restraint Petition Of: Patrick J. Mcallister, 49417-5

Background

Petitioner Patrick McAllister (defendant at trial) was convicted after a 2012 jury trial of multiple counts of second- and third-degree rape and fourth-degree assault based principally on the testimony of the victim, S.L.
S.L., a Filipino national who entered the U.S. on a K-1 fiancée visa, alleged repeated rapes and assaults while living in McAllister’s home in 2010; nurses later testified to vaginal bruising, lesions, bleeding, and pelvic pain.
At trial the parties stipulated to exclude evidence of S.L.’s STDs; the trial court also excluded evidence of past sexual behavior under the rape-shield rules.
McAllister testified he had serious, documented physical limitations (knee/ankle injury, pronounced limp) that made the alleged acts physically implausible; trial counsel did not produce medical records or call treating physicians or a sexual-assault expert.
On direct appeal one rape conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence; Division Three held there was no record that counsel knew of corroborating medical evidence and suggested collateral review if McAllister could show such evidence.
In this personal restraint petition the Court of Appeals (Div. II) found trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in several respects and that the prosecutor violated Brady by failing to provide the third page of S.L.’s May 10, 2010 written statement (which contradicted later trial testimony about the last date of alleged rape). The petition was granted and convictions reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (McAllister)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Defense failure to use corroborating medical evidence / call treating doctors about petitioner’s physical limitations	Counsel ignored available medical records and witnesses who would have corroborated that McAllister could not physically have kicked or raped S.L.; this was prejudicial	Trial counsel made a reasonable tactical choice to focus on witness inconsistencies; some medical records could have been damaging	Counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial; failure to present corroborating medical evidence deprived McAllister of a fair trial
Failure to call a sexual-assault expert and stipulation excluding S.L.’s STD evidence	Counsel should not have stipulated to bar STD evidence or failed to retain an expert who could have explained that S.L.’s lesions/bleeding/bruising could be from an untreated STD or consensual sex	State argued strategic reasons and that rape-shield/irrelevance barred some STD evidence; not necessarily ineffective to decline an expert	Counsel’s stipulation and failure to retain an expert were deficient; reasonable probability of different outcome if expert/STD evidence admitted
Ineffective cross-examination / impeachment of S.L.	Counsel failed to develop numerous inconsistencies in S.L.’s prior statements (dates, existence of boyfriend, prior statements to police and at protection hearing) that would have undermined her credibility	State contended cross-exam decisions were trial strategy and within counsel’s discretion	Counsel’s cross-examination was deficient; cumulative failures could have changed outcome given centrality of credibility
Brady violation for suppression of third page of S.L.’s May 10, 2010 statement	Prosecutor (or police) suppressed an exculpatory third page showing "April 9th was the last time he raped me," contradicting S.L.’s trial testimony and undermining several convictions	State did not meaningfully contest suppression in the opinion	Withheld third page was favorable, suppressed, and material; its nondisclosure was a Brady violation likely to have changed the verdict

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecutor’s suppression of favorable evidence violates due process)
In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1 (2013) (PRP standards and relief when actual and substantial prejudice shown)
State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17 (2011) (tactical decisions by counsel and when they do not constitute deficient performance)