Personal Restraint Petition Of: Joshua Dean Mcintyre
81806-6
| Wash. Ct. App. | Jul 19, 2021Background
- McIntyre suffered a traumatic brain injury (TBI) in a 2010 car crash and had a prior vehicular-assault conviction (2013).
- In 2017 he was convicted of second-degree rape of a child (indeterminate sentence: minimum 158 months to life) and third-degree rape of a child (41 months); sentences ran concurrently; the court imposed community custody terms, various conditions (including condition 8), and LFOs.
- Defense sought a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA) for the second-degree rape based on TBI-related amenability to treatment; the trial court denied SSOSA.
- McIntyre filed a timely personal restraint petition (PRP) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, that the third-degree rape sentence plus community custody exceeded the statutory maximum, that community custody condition 8 is unconstitutionally vague, and that certain LFOs were imposed without an indigency assessment.
- Sentencing occurred in April 2017; the court found McIntyre indigent in May 2017 for appellate counsel; the Legislature amended RCW 10.01.160 in 2018 (applicable to cases pending on direct review) restricting imposition of LFOs on those found indigent.
Issues
| Issue | McIntyre's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance at sentencing | Counsel failed to cite legal authority (e.g., Light-Roth, O’Dell) to support mitigation based on youth/neurological deficits | Counsel made the relevant factual/neurological mitigation arguments; cited cases were inapposite | Denied — counsel reasonably focused on neurological mitigation; failing to cite inapposite cases not deficient |
| Sentence duration (3rd-degree rape) | Combined confinement + community custody exceeds statutory max for class C felony | No meaningful dispute; State concedes error | Granted remand — reduce community custody so total does not exceed statutory maximum |
| Community custody condition 8 ("no forming relationships with families who have minor children") | Condition is unconstitutionally vague and invites arbitrary enforcement | Condition gives sufficient guidance (prohibits more than a passing acquaintance) | Granted remand — condition 8 is vague (lacks objective standards); strike or clarify on resentencing |
| Discretionary LFOs (criminal filing and DNA fees) | LFOs were imposed without assessing indigency; 2018 amendment forbids LFOs for those indigent at sentencing | McIntyre did not raise on direct appeal, but PRP timely; State offers no authority to bar PRP review | Granted remand — trial court must determine whether McIntyre was indigent at sentencing and whether LFOs must be vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (governs ineffective-assistance standard)
- Matter of Lui, 188 Wn.2d 525 (2017) (IAC review and presumption of reasonable counsel)
- State v. Boyd, 174 Wn.2d 470 (2012) (reduce community custody when combined term exceeds statutory maximum)
- State v. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671 (2018) (upheld condition requiring notification of "dating relationship" as sufficiently definite)
- State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672 (2018) (standard for vagueness and arbitrary enforcement of supervision conditions)
- State v. Sanchez-Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782 (2010) (fair-warning requirement for vague criminal prohibitions)
- State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732 (2018) (2018 statutory amendments limit LFOs for defendants found indigent)
- United States v. Reeves, 591 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2010) (subjective qualifiers may be upheld if tethered to objective criteria)