Personal Restraint Petition Of Joseph Leif Wolf
196 Wash. App. 496
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In 2008 Joseph Wolf (age 16) pleaded guilty in adult court to two counts of first-degree child rape after charges were filed in adult court under Washington’s "automatic decline" statute (RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(C)).
- The parties agreed to a SSOSA (special sex offender sentencing alternative): 131.9 months total with 12 months confinement and 119.9 months suspended conditioned on treatment; the trial court accepted the agreement.
- The court imposed $800 in statutory LFOs and $400 discretionary LFOs without an individualized ability-to-pay inquiry. Wolf was released in 2009 and repeatedly violated SSOSA conditions.
- In 2012 the trial court revoked Wolf’s SSOSA and ordered service of the suspended sentence; the trial court later added appellate costs after Wolf’s unsuccessful direct appeal of the revocation.
- Wolf filed a personal restraint petition (filed in 2015) arguing (1) the automatic-decline statute and his adult sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment, (2) the sentencing court failed to consider his youth, and (3) LFOs and appellate costs were unlawfully imposed without assessing ability to pay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v) (automatic decline of juvenile jurisdiction for certain crimes) violates the Eighth Amendment and warrants relief | Wolf: Mandatory adult-court jurisdiction is unconstitutional because it prevents consideration of youth; thus his Eighth Amendment rights were violated | State: Even if statute were problematic, Wolf must show actual and substantial prejudice from it; prior authority rejects an Eighth Amendment bar | Denied — Wolf failed to prove by a preponderance that, but for the statute, the court would likely have retained jurisdiction in juvenile court, so no actual and substantial prejudice shown |
| Whether the sentencing court violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to consider Wolf’s youth at sentencing | Wolf: Eighth Amendment (per Roper/Graham/Miller) requires consideration of youth; trial court should have considered youth when imposing sentence | State: Trial court adopted a jointly proposed SSOSA; Wolf agreed to the sentence and does not claim he would have rejected it | Denied — Youth was immaterial to the agreed SSOSA; Wolf did not show he would have chosen ordinary sentencing even if youth were considered |
| Whether LFO challenge is timely (ability-to-pay inquiry and Blazina-related arguments) | Wolf: LFOs imposed without ability-to-pay inquiry render judgment invalid on its face; PRP timely under exceptions | State: PRP filed more than one year after judgment became final; the SSOSA revocation did not affect 2008 LFOs; Blazina and related change-in-law exception do not apply | Denied as time-barred — Judgment became final in 2008; no applicable exception to the one-year PRP bar established |
| Whether appellate costs imposed after the revocation require an ability-to-pay inquiry | Wolf: Appellate costs were imposed without assessing ability to pay, violating Blazina principles | State: RCW 10.73.160 (appellate costs) is distinct from discretionary trial LFO statutes; Blazina’s ability-to-pay requirement applies only to discretionary LFOs under RCW 10.01.160 | Denied — Imposition of appellate costs without an ability-to-pay inquiry was not unlawful because the statutory scheme for appellate costs does not impose that requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (recognizes juveniles’ Eighth Amendment protections against death penalty)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (Eighth Amendment limits on life without parole for juveniles in nonhomicide cases)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencing must consider youth)
- Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (procedural factors for juvenile transfer decisions)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123 (PRP relief standards; prejudice requirement)
- State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 (requirement to assess defendant’s ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Dove, 196 Wn. App. 148 (judgment "valid on its face" analysis for PRP time bar)
