Personal Restraint Petition Of Jesse Marion White, 71886-0

Background

Jesse M. White lived with Raina Stevens and their 2‑year‑old child; after Stevens moved out temporarily, she brought the child to discuss custody with White.
During the visit White pointed a gun at Stevens, threatened to kill her, grabbed her by the hair, threw her face‑first to the floor, beat her, and then placed hands on her neck (strangulation); the child was present and screamed.
Police were called; White was arrested after a brief chase and the child recovered.
White was charged and convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree assault (one for threatening/pointing the gun, one for strangulation), each with firearm enhancements; other convictions are not at issue here.
On direct appeal this court held the two convictions were for different statutory alternatives and did not violate double jeopardy; the Washington Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of State v. Villanueva‑Gonzalez.
On remand this court applies Villanueva‑Gonzalez’s course‑of‑conduct test and concludes the two assaultive acts were a single course of conduct; one assault conviction and its firearm enhancement must be vacated.

Issues

Issue	White's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether White’s two assault convictions violate double jeopardy	The pointing/threat and the strangulation were part of a single, uninterrupted course of conduct (same time, place, intent)	The offenses were distinct acts with different intents and interruptions, so separate convictions are permissible	Vacated one conviction: the acts were a single course of conduct and double jeopardy bars two convictions
Whether the Villanueva‑Gonzalez factors support single course of conduct	Factors (short duration, same location, same intent, no interruptions, no chance to reconsider) weigh for a single course	Argues different intent, interruptions (standing up, uncharged beating), and opportunities to reconsider (child screaming, letting go of gun)	Court finds factors (including intent, continuity, no meaningful opportunity to reconsider) favor single course of conduct
Relevance of State’s prior concession at sentencing that the acts were same criminal conduct	White notes State conceded same intent/continuity at sentencing, supporting single course analysis	State argues sentencing “same criminal conduct” analysis differs from double jeopardy unit‑of‑prosecution inquiry and concession is irrelevant	Court treats concession as persuasive on intent/continuity; focuses on Villanueva‑Gonzalez totality analysis rather than unit‑of‑prosecution technicalities
Whether policy concerns (avoiding under‑punishing repeat assaults) defeat course‑of‑conduct treatment for domestic violence	White relies on Villanueva‑Gonzalez rule treating assault as course of conduct under rule of lenity	State invokes Tili and public policy to avoid letting a perpetrator commit multiple assaults with only one punishment	Court distinguishes rape/Tili and adheres to Villanueva‑Gonzalez: assault is a course of conduct crime, policy concerns do not override the statutory interpretation here

Key Cases Cited

State v. Villanueva‑Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d 975 (2014) (assault is a course‑of‑conduct crime; five‑factor totality test)
State v. Tili, 139 Wn.2d 107 (1999) (discusses unit of prosecution and policy limiting multiple convictions for related sexual assaults)
State v. Jackman, 156 Wn.2d 736 (2006) (standard of review for double jeopardy questions)
State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 620 (1998) (distinguishing sentencing same‑criminal‑conduct inquiries from unit‑of‑prosecution issues)