Personal Restraint Petition Of Jeremiah Bourgeois, 74850-5

In 1992, 14-year-old Jeremiah Bourgeois participated in a murder; he was convicted in 1993 of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced under former RCW 10.95.030 to life without parole and without any good-time (earned early release) calculation.
In 2012 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, holding mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles unconstitutional unless the sentencer can consider youth-related mitigating factors.
Washington enacted a "Miller fix" in 2014 (with a 2015 technical clarification), amending RCW 10.95.030 to provide resentencing for juveniles: a maximum of life and a mandatory minimum of 25 years, with no eligibility for earned release during the minimum term.
Bourgeois was resentenced in 2014 to a 25-year minimum and life maximum; the ISRB confirmed he was not eligible for good-time/earned release during the minimum term and has not been awarded earned release time during that period.
Bourgeois filed a petition claiming the Miller fix and the 2015 statutory language violated the ex post facto clauses because they removed an alleged earned-credit interest he contends existed under earlier law.

Issue	Bourgeois' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the Miller fix and 2015 amendments violate the Ex Post Facto Clause by denying earned early release credits during the 25-year minimum	Bourgeois: Miller rendered his original sentence unconstitutional and he had a liberty interest in earning good-time credits (under former SR 9.94A.150), so the new laws retroactively increased his punishment by denying that credit	State: Bourgeois was sentenced under RCW 10.95 (not the Sentencing Reform Act), so he never had an entitlement to earned release; the Miller fix reduced—rather than increased—his punishment by allowing parole consideration after 25 years; the 2015 language merely clarified the prohibition on earned release during the minimum term	The court denied relief: the Miller fix did not increase Bourgeois' quantum of punishment; former SR statutes never applied to him; the ex post facto guarantee was not violated

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory juvenile life without parole unconstitutional absent individualized consideration of youth)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (retroactive reduction of good-time credit can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause)
State v. Pillatos, 159 Wn.2d 459 (2007) (an unconstitutional statute may still inform ex post facto comparison because it provided notice at the time of the offense)
In re Pers. Restraint of McNeil, 181 Wn.2d 582 (2014) (Washington precedent on application of Miller fix and resentencing procedures)