Personal Restraint Petition Of: Jamal D. Smith, 49127-3

In 2003, Jamal D. Smith (17 at the time) shot a victim and later, after turning 18, arranged a break-in intended to prevent the victim from testifying; he was charged and convicted of multiple offenses including two counts of attempted first-degree murder and firearm enhancements.
Smith received lengthy consecutive sentences totaling 700 months (58 years, 4 months), with portions imposed for offenses committed while under 18 and others after turning 18.
Smith filed a collateral challenge (personal restraint petition) arguing his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because the sentencing court failed to consider his youth and applied mandatory firearm enhancements and consecutive serious-violent-offense rules.
The State conceded that recent Washington precedent (State v. Houston-Sconiers) entitled Smith to relief and that the petition was not time-barred under the statutory exception for significant changes in the law.
The Court of Appeals accepted the concession, held Miller and Houston-Sconiers materially changed the law and apply retroactively, found constitutional error and prejudice, reversed Smith's sentences, and remanded for resentencing to allow full consideration of youth-related mitigation.

Issue	Smith's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Is the PRP time‑barred under RCW 10.73.090?	Miller/Houston‑Sconiers are a significant, retroactive change allowing a late PRP.	Conceded that petition is not time‑barred.	Petition not time‑barred under RCW 10.73.100(6).
Did the sentencing violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to consider youth?	Sentences functioned as de facto life‑without‑parole for juvenile offenses and mandatory enhancements prevented consideration of youth.	State conceded Houston‑Sconiers requires resentencing.	Court found constitutional error and actual prejudice; resentencing required.
Do Miller and Houston‑Sconiers apply retroactively?	Miller (per Montgomery) is retroactive; Houston‑Sconiers interprets state statute and thus applies retroactively.	Conceded.	Both apply retroactively to collateral challenges.
May trial courts depart below mandatory firearm enhancements and consecutive serious‑violent rules for juvenile offenders?	Yes—sentencing courts must have full discretion to consider youth and may depart below mandatory enhancements.	Previously argued mandatory application was required, but State conceded after Houston‑Sconiers.	Court follows Houston‑Sconiers: sentencing courts have absolute discretion to depart; mandatory enhancements unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller rule is retroactive on collateral review)
State v. Houston‑Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (Washington: sentencing courts have full discretion to depart below mandatory ranges/enhancements for juveniles)
State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 (discusses juvenile sentencing considerations under state law)
State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20 (overruled on point by Houston‑Sconiers regarding mandatory enhancements)