Personal Restraint Petition Of Gary Daniel Meredith, 46671-6

In 1996 Gary Meredith was tried for second-degree rape of a child (count I) and communication with a minor for immoral purposes (count II); conviction and 198-month sentence followed.
The State sought to admit Meredith’s prior sexual-felony convictions both to elevate count II to a felony (an element of the offense) and under ER 404(b); the trial court allowed the prior convictions on both theories.
Jury selection: court empaneled 14 jurors (12 to decide, 2 alternates) but mistakenly allotted only seven peremptory challenges per side instead of eight; both parties used all seven challenges and no objection was raised at trial.
During trial the court gave a brief limiting instruction that the prior-conviction evidence ‘‘may be considered by you in deciding Count II and for no other purpose’’; the jury later convicted on both counts.
On collateral review via a personal restraint petition (PRP), Meredith argued ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the peremptory-challenge error on direct appeal; he also challenged ER 404(b) admission and the adequacy of the limiting instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Meredith)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Trial court gave only seven peremptory challenges per side though 14 jurors were empaneled	Meredith: entitled to eight peremptory challenges (one per alternate); appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this on direct appeal	State: peremptory challenges are statutory, not constitutional; any denial is not structural and Meredith cannot show actual prejudice	Court: Appellate counsel was ineffective; Meredith entitled to eight challenges and denial required reversal (prejudice established)
Admissibility of prior felony sex convictions under ER 404(b)	Meredith: prior convictions were improperly admitted under ER 404(b) and were overly prejudicial	State: convictions admissible both as element of count II and under ER 404(b) to show absence of mistake, plan, etc.	Court: Prior convictions were admissible as an element of count II but not admissible under ER 404(b); admission under ER 404(b) was erroneous
Adequacy of limiting instruction on prior-conviction evidence	Meredith: limiting instruction failed to explain that conviction could be used only to prove the element elevating count II	State: instruction limited use to count II	Court: Instruction insufficient — it did not tell jurors the prior-conviction fact could be considered only to prove the element of count II; trial court erred

State v. Vreen, 143 Wn.2d 923 (2001) (erroneous denial of peremptory challenge reversible when juror deliberates)
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (peremptory challenges are state-created means to secure impartial jury)
Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (2009) (peremptory challenges are creatures of statute and not themselves constitutional rights)
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (defendant may stipulate to prior conviction to avoid prejudicial details)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (when prior conviction increases punishment or is an element, the fact must be proven)
State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405 (2012) (ER 404(b) framework and limiting-instruction duties)