94 F.4th 136
1st Cir.2024Background:
- In Dec. 2010 DOC officials moved Jwainus Perry from general population to Special Management Units (SMUs) after an anonymous letter alleging gang-related threats.
- SMU conditions were solitary-like: up to 23–24 hours/day in a cell, meals alone, 1 hour outdoor exercise alone, limited visits/phone; Perry spent ~15 consecutive months in SMUs and another ~4.5 months later (total ≈ two years).
- DOC regulations then allowed "awaiting action" SMU placements without requiring notice of factual basis, an opportunity to rebut, or any durational cap; separate DSU rules provided notice/hearing and shorter caps.
- While Perry remained in SMU, the Massachusetts SJC decided LaChance (Nov. 2012), holding that awaiting-action administrative segregation >90 days requires notice, hearing, and written decision.
- Perry sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming violation of procedural due process; the district court granted qualified-immunity summary judgment for defendants, a First Circuit panel affirmed, and the en banc Court likewise affirmed on qualified-immunity grounds.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Perry's prolonged SMU confinement implicated a state-created liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment | Perry: conditions were solitary and the duration (15+ months) was atypical and significant relative to DOC norms and regs, so Sandin/Wilkinson protection applies | Defs: SMU/administrative segregation is within ordinary prison practices; confinement contingent on transfer (not indefinite); no clear liberty interest | Court: A reasonable juror could find Perry's prolonged solitary-like confinement was an "atypical and significant hardship" (liberty interest) given its length and lack of contrary evidence from defendants |
| What process was constitutionally due if a liberty interest was implicated | Perry: entitled to notice of factual basis and an opportunity to present views/rebut (Hewitt/Greenholtz/Wilkinson/Mathews) | Defs: DOC provided SMU reviews, classification hearing, and grievance procedures; those satisfied process | Held: A reasonable juror could find Perry was denied a meaningful opportunity for rebuttal—SMU reviews and the early classification hearing did not necessarily afford the constitutionally required opportunity to contest SMU placement |
| Whether defendants actually denied the process required | Perry: SMU Reviews were not notice/hearing and grievances were routinely dismissed as non-grievable; classification hearing addressed facility placement, not SMU status | Defs: SMU Reviews and available grievance/classification procedures provided sufficient process | Held: Disputed facts permit a reasonable juror to conclude Perry was denied the required opportunity to contest the factual basis for his segregation |
| Whether officials are entitled to qualified immunity (was the right clearly established?) | Perry: Wilkinson post-dates many precedents; his confinement was comparable to Wilkinson so law was clearly established post-Wilkinson | Defs: Pre-2010 precedent in this circuit and others left the baseline unsettled; no robust consensus that the conditions/duration at issue were clearly unconstitutional | Held: Officials entitled to qualified immunity — it was not clearly established at the time that Perry’s particular prolonged SMU confinement (pending out-of-state transfer and contingent termination) violated the Due Process Clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (U.S. 1995) (state-created liberty interests arise only when confinement imposes an "atypical and significant hardship" relative to ordinary prison life)
- Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (U.S. 2005) (placement in supermax with indefinite duration and parole consequences constituted atypical and significant hardship and required informal procedures)
- Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (U.S. 1983) (previous regulations-focused framework for prison due process; later narrowed by Sandin)
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (U.S. 1974) (state policies can create liberty interests; procedural protections required in prison disciplinary contexts)
- Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (U.S. 1980) (transfer to mental hospital implicated a liberty interest requiring due process)
- Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (U.S. 1990) (involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs implicates liberty interest)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (balancing test for what process is due)
- Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1979) (parole-board procedures illustrating opportunity to present views/rebuttal)
- Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2005) (40 days administrative segregation not atypical; exemplifies baseline uncertainty among circuits)
- LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 978 N.E.2d 1199 (Mass. 2012) (Mass. SJC: awaiting-action administrative segregation >90 days requires notice, hearing, and written decision)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (courts may choose order of qualified-immunity analysis)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (U.S. 2018) (clearly established law standard for qualified immunity)