Perry v. Colvin
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68034
N.D. Ill.2013Background
- Perry sought DIB and SSI with an alleged onset in 2004 following a 2004 bus accident that allegedly caused fibromyalgia and multi-symptom impairments.
- She previously filed a 2006 claim; current claims were treated as an implied request to reopen the 2006 application after initial denials (2008).
- An ALJ held a hearing in 2010 and issued an unfavorable decision denying benefits; Appeals Council denied review in 2010.
- Record contains extensive medical evidence from 2004–2007 including fibromyalgia, panic disorder, depression, hearing loss, and obesity history, with various specialists making multiple assessments.
- The ALJ concluded Perry had a wide range of light work capacity with certain limitations and found her not disabled; the court granted remand and denied summary judgment to the Commissioner.
- The remand order accompanies a finding that the plaintiff’s GAF score of 45 indicates serious impairment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ALJ properly weighed state agency medical opinions | Perry claims ARJmand, Bone, Tomassetti, Hermsmeyer were inadequately offset; ALJ failed to explain weight and omitted mental RFC limitations. | Defendant argues ALJ considered opinions and integrated them with evidence; any added limitations were based on changes since reviews. | Remand required for improper analysis of medical opinions and lack of logical bridge. |
| Whether the ALJ’s credibility assessment complied with SSR 96-7p | ALJ used boilerplate and post-hoc adjustments to credibility; failed to ground credibility in the record with specific reasons. | ALJ considered inconsistencies, treatment gaps, and objective evidence; credibility findings supported by record. | Remand for improper credibility analysis; need explicit, evidence-grounded reasoning. |
| Whether the RFC and hypothetical to the vocational expert properly reflect limitations | ALJ impermissibly substituted own judgment; did not include limitations from Hermsmeyer and Arjmand in RFC/hypothetical. | RFC reflects overall record; VE testimony supports availability of jobs under the stated restrictions. | Remand to correct RFC and VE hypotheticals with proper analysis of medical opinions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299 (7th Cir. 2010) (cannot selectively discuss favorable portions of medical reports)
- Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (boilerplate credibility language criticized; must have proper path from evidence to conclusions)
- Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1995) (ALJ must articulate the basis for credibility findings; cannot rely on mere recitation of records)
- Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (remand when the ALJ lacks a proper analysis bridging evidence and outcome)
- Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2010) (post-hoc rationalization rejected; avoid relying on evidence not considered at the outset)
- Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001) (requires a logical bridge between evidence and the ALJ's conclusions)
- Brindisi on Behalf of Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2003) (boilerplate credibility language scrutinized; still require reasons grounded in evidence)
- Conrad v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2006) (medical opinions must be considered and addressed; RFC must reflect those opinions)