Perry v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc.
985 F. Supp. 2d 669
E.D. Pa.2013Background
- Plaintiff Alice Perry alleges her husband developed asbestos-related injuries from handling RFPC brake shoes on railcars; she sued RFPC under state law.
- RFPC moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq.
- Plaintiff contends the LIA does not preempt claims involving brake shoes on railcars because those parts are not locomotive parts or appurtenances.
- The controlling legal question follows the Supreme Court’s decision in Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., which reaffirmed broad field preemption under the LIA as announced in Napier.
- The district court concluded railcar brake shoes fall within the LIA’s preemptive field as a part of the locomotive braking system or an appurtenance regulated by the Secretary of Transportation, and granted RFPC’s motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state-law tort claims alleging injury from asbestos in brake shoes on railcars are preempted by the LIA | Perry: brake shoes on railcars are not locomotive "parts or appurtenances," so LIA does not preempt | RFPC: railcar brake shoes are part of the locomotive braking system/appurtenance and fall within LIA field preemption | Held: Preempted — railcar brake shoes are within the LIA’s preemptive field (integral to locomotive braking system and within Secretary’s regulatory authority) |
Key Cases Cited
- Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (LIA occupies entire field of regulating locomotive equipment)
- Kurns v. Railroad Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012) (reaffirming Napier and broad field preemption under the LIA)
- Kurns v. Chesterton, 620 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2010) (Third Circuit decision on LIA preemption affirmed by Supreme Court)
- S. Ry. Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398 (1936) (definition of "parts and appurtenances": integral or essential parts and items subject to Secretary’s orders)
- Marshall v. Burlington N., Inc., 720 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1983) (if Secretary has authority to prescribe a part or attachment, state may not impose liability)