Perlot v. Green, 609 F.Supp.3d 1106

Background

On April 1, 2022 the University of Idaho law school held a “moment of community” after an anti‑LGBTQ+ slur; Plaintiffs (three law students in the Christian Legal Society and their faculty advisor) prayed and discussed CLS’s religious view that marriage is between a man and a woman with a student identified as Jane Doe.
After the interaction, Plaintiff Perlot left a friendly note on Doe’s carrel; Doe reported feeling “targeted and unsafe.”
OCRI issued no‑contact orders to students Perlot, Miller, and Alexander on April 7 (no end dates) and later issued a limited contact order against Professor Seamon on May 10; Doe did not file a formal Title IX complaint and Plaintiffs were not afforded pre‑order process.
Plaintiffs sued seeking a TRO/Preliminary Injunction to rescind the orders, terminate any investigation based on speech alone, expunge records, and curb enforcement of policies that punish "pure speech."
The Court held an expedited hearing and granted the preliminary injunction, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on their First Amendment (speech and free exercise) and Due Process claims and that Title IX did not justify the orders as applied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do OCRI no‑contact orders abridge Plaintiffs’ First Amendment free speech rights (content/viewpoint discrimination; prior restraint)?	Orders target Plaintiffs’ religiously grounded speech and are content/viewpoint based; no least‑restrictive tailoring.	Orders were neutral "supportive measures" to protect a student and were mutual, non‑punitive, and required by Title IX.	Court: Likely First Amendment violation—orders appear content/viewpoint discriminatory and not narrowly tailored; strict scrutiny not met.
Can Title IX/supportive‑measures requirements justify the orders here (harassment standard)?	Plaintiffs: Title IX does not authorize no‑contact orders for "pure speech" that is not severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive; no Title IX trigger here.	Defendants: OCRI acted under Title IX to provide supportive measures to protect a complainant from unwanted contact and distress.	Court: Not a Title IX harassment case as pleaded; Defendants failed to show sexual harassment threshold or that Title IX compelled the orders as least‑restrictive means.
Do the orders violate Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise rights?	Orders target religious viewpoint and apply individualized, discretionary exemptions—triggering strict scrutiny.	Defendants: Actions are neutral efforts to protect campus safety and victims.	Court: Likely Free Exercise violation; policies applied in a way suggesting non‑neutral treatment of religious speech.
Did OCRI deny Plaintiffs procedural due process before issuing orders?	Plaintiffs received little or no notice or meaningful opportunity to respond before orders issued.	Defendants: Orders were supportive, non‑punitive, and administratively necessary; qualified immunity concerns.	Court: Likely Due Process violation—orders issued after limited, one‑sided steps and without adequate process; PI relief appropriate.

Key Cases Cited

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (student speech on campus has strong First Amendment protection)
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (student speech protected unless it causes substantial disruption)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (content‑based speech regulations are presumptively unconstitutional)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (viewpoint discrimination is especially forbidden)
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standards for preliminary injunctions)
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (laws not neutral or generally applicable trigger strict scrutiny under Free Exercise)
Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (Title IX actionable harassment must be severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive)
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (limits on coercive or captive‑audience interactions contrasted with protected persuasive speech)
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (religious‑neutrality principles in Free Exercise analysis)
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (discrimination "because of sex" includes sexual orientation for statutory purposes)
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) (alternative preliminary injunction framework: serious questions + balance tipping sharply)
Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (strict scrutiny requires least‑restrictive means)
Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2018) (permissible disciplinary action where persistent unwanted contact continued after repeated refusals)
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (state may not restrict speech merely because it could be exercised elsewhere)
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (content‑based suppression of expression conflicts with First Amendment values)