Perlmutter v. Varone
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99438
D.D.C.2014Background
- Pro se plaintiffs Dawn Perlmutter and Thomas Bolick sued multiple defendants (family members, attorneys, judges, Montgomery County, and Hope Village) alleging a scheme to defraud Perlmutter out of her mother Joan Sutton’s estate probated in Montgomery County, Maryland.
- Plaintiffs pleaded thirteen counts (§ 1983, First Amendment retaliation, conspiracy, fraud, RICO, conversion, unjust enrichment, negligence, and equitable relief) and sought >$90,000,000 plus constructive trust and disgorgement.
- Underlying events: probate, related Maryland state-court litigation, and appeals concerning the Sutton estate; plaintiffs previously sued in Maryland and lost, and judges McGann and Salant imposed or were involved in rulings contested by plaintiffs.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); most defendants are Maryland residents and the operative events occurred in Maryland.
- Plaintiffs alleged some contacts with D.C. (Hope Village located in D.C., asserted Varone “headquarters” there), but the court found those allegations insubstantial relative to the Maryland-centered claims.
- Court concluded venue is improper in the District of Columbia and dismissed the complaint (declining to reach other defenses); judges named are noted as judicially immune for acts within their official capacity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue is proper in D.C. under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (substantial part of events occurred in D.C.) | Perlmutter: substantial acts/operational headquarters of Varones and Hope Village are in D.C., so venue is proper there. | Defendants: key events—probate, litigation, injuries, property—occurred in Maryland; D.C. contacts are minimal or peripheral. | Venue not proper under § 1391(b)(2); D.C. lacked a substantial portion of operative events. |
| Whether any defendant’s residence supports venue in D.C. under § 1391(b)(1) | Plaintiffs asserted some defendants or entities function in D.C. | Defendants showed nearly all defendants reside in Maryland (and one in Pennsylvania); Hope Village in rem is in D.C. but other requirements lacking. | § 1391(b)(1) not satisfied: most defendants reside in Maryland so D.C. inappropriate. |
| Whether the property in D.C. (Hope Village) is "the subject of the action" under § 1391(b)(2) | Plaintiffs: Hope Village is the Varone “headquarters” and in rem defendant, so venue proper. | Defendants: the principal property dispute concerns Sutton’s estate (Maryland); Hope Village is not the subject of the action. | Court held Hope Village is not the subject of the action; property at issue is the Maryland estate. |
| Whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) | Plaintiffs sought to litigate in D.C.; implied interest in transfer rather than dismissal. | Defendants sought dismissal for improper venue; argued D.C. lacks meaningful ties to dispute. | Court dismissed the complaint (not transferred), finding D.C. has minimal interest and dismissal appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (substantial-part test requires commonsense appraisal of events having operative significance).
- Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (judicial immunity protects judges from civil liability for judicial acts).
- Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (district court discretion governs dismissal vs. transfer under § 1406(a)).
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed).
- Modaressi v. Vedadi, 441 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006) (clarifies that plaintiff need not pick the forum where the most events occurred, but must show a considerable portion occurred there).