Perkins v. Linkedin Corp.
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81042
| N.D. Cal. | 2014Background
- Plaintiffs (nine LinkedIn users, representing a putative nationwide class) allege LinkedIn harvested email addresses from users’ external contact lists during signup and sent invitation/“endorsement” emails (an initial invitation plus two automated reminders) to those contacts bearing the user’s name.
- The signup flow: user supplies email → LinkedIn shows a Google Accounts consent screen listing “Google Contacts” (Allow / No thanks) → LinkedIn displays contacts (checked by default) and a page showing number selected (e.g., “1132 Selected”) with options “Add to Network” or “Skip this step” → if Add, LinkedIn emails contacts and sends two follow-up emails at weekly intervals if the contact does not join.
- Plaintiffs asserted five claims in the First Amended Complaint: California common-law right of publicity, UCL (unlawful/unfair/fraudulent), Stored Communications Act (SCA), Wiretap Act, and California Penal Code § 502 (computer access/fraud). LinkedIn moved to dismiss; the Court considered standing, consent/authorization, and merits.
- Key factual disputes include (a) whether the on-screen disclosures and the Google consent screen amounted to users’ consent to harvesting and emailing, and (b) whether LinkedIn exceeded or bypassed technical barriers (for § 502). Plaintiffs also relied on LinkedIn statements and user Help Center complaints to show knowledge and misrepresentation.
- The Court took judicial notice of various LinkedIn and Google web pages and interviews cited by the parties; denied notice of a New York Times blog article.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing for publicity, UCL, §502 claims | Names/likeness used as personalized endorsements have market value; Plaintiffs therefore suffered concrete injury | No cognizable injury; viral growth theory insufficient | Plaintiffs have standing—court follows Fraley: personalized endorsements confer economic value; standing denied as to LinkedIn's challenge was rejected |
| SCA and Wiretap Act (collection of contacts) — consent/authorization | Users did not consent to broad harvesting/storage; disclosures were unclear and buried | On-screen Google consent and LinkedIn pages (Allow/No thanks, list showing selected contacts and numbers) show objective authorization | Consent/authorization defeats SCA and Wiretap claims; dismissal granted as to these claims |
| Common-law right of publicity (use of name in invitation emails) — consent & injury | Use of names in emails is nonconsensual appropriation; reminders cause reputational harm | Disclosures and checked recipients show consent to send invitations; reminder emails are same as initial invite so no separate harm | Initial invitation: consent found, claim dismissed as to first email; Second and third reminder emails: no disclosure of additional reminders, plausible lack of consent and independent reputational harm — claim survives as to reminders |
| §502 (Cal. Penal Code) — access without authorization / circumventing technical barriers | LinkedIn bypassed technical/password barriers ("tunneling/hacking") when users were logged into Gmail and LinkedIn didn’t re-prompt for password | No circumvention of code-based barriers; users’ login state—not LinkedIn—enabled access | §502 dismissed: pleadings do not show LinkedIn overcame technical/code barriers or that plaintiffs suffered damage from that conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (personalized endorsements via social platform may have measurable commercial value and support standing)
- Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (mere disclosure to existing friends insufficient to show cognizable harm)
- In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (statutory violations like Wiretap Act/SCA can confer Article III standing)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete, particularized, and imminent injury)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (standing is a threshold jurisdictional requirement)