Perez v. Richland Parish Detention Center
3:19-cv-01124
W.D. La.Oct 24, 2019Background
- Randy Perez, a pro se prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, sued Richland Parish Detention Center (RPDC), Warden Ricky Scott, Chief of Security Shaw, and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (LDPSC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after a June 23, 2019 inmate attack in Dorm H that cracked his teeth and allegedly caused PTSD and other systemic harm.
- After the attack Perez was placed on lockdown/held in a holding tank (June 24–July 22, 2019) and alleges intermittent deprivation of showers, outdoor time, phone access, outgoing mail, clean water, clean clothes, and ice; he developed a heat rash and sought but did not receive immediate dental/medical care at RPDC.
- Perez also described prior violent incidents in the dorm and alleged general staffing/weapon-search deficiencies, poor food, and asserted a state-law breach (La. Rev. Stat. § 39:1800.4) and sought injunctive relief, $3,000,000 in damages, reimbursement of court costs, and parole.
- Perez was transferred from RPDC before filing; he later received dental care at his new facility. He sued only under federal law (§ 1983).
- The magistrate judge screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2) and recommended dismissal for multiple reasons including lack of capacity to be sued, non‑cognizability under § 1983, lack of standing, failure to plead deliberate indifference, and § 1997e(e) limits on emotional‑only damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Perez) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capacity to be sued: RPDC and LDPSC named as defendants | RPDC and LDPSC are proper defendants responsible for conditions and failure to protect | RPDC is not a juridical person under Louisiana law; LDPSC (a state agency) is not a "person" under § 1983 | Dismiss RPDC (no juridical person) and LDPSC (not a § 1983 person) |
| Failure to protect (Scott, Shaw) | Scott/Shaw knew of pervasive violence and risks in Dorm H, failed to search for weapons, understaffed/made staff short‑hand, were deliberately indifferent | Allegations are conclusory; plaintiff fails to show personal involvement, notice of a substantial risk to Perez, or an unconstitutional policy/custom causing his injuries | Dismissed for failure to plausibly allege deliberate indifference or supervisory liability |
| Conditions of confinement & damages (lockdown deprivations) | Intermittent denial of showers, clean water, clothes, phone, outdoor time, and ice caused extreme deprivation, medical/psychological harm, and lifelong injury to his "endocannabinoid system" | Deprivations were transient/episodic, not objectively extreme or creating substantial risk of serious harm; Perez alleges only mental/emotional harms without more‑than‑de minimis physical injury | Dismissed: conditions not plead as extreme; compensatory damages for emotional harms barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) absent more‑than‑de‑minimis physical injury |
| Medical care, access to phone/mail, parole, state law breach | Denied timely medical care for teeth and heat rash in lockdown; inability to send mail/call courts; seeks parole and asserts state statutory/contract breach | Perez fails to show Scott/Shaw were deliberately indifferent or personally responsible; lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of other inmates/staff; state statutory/contract claims are not § 1983 claims; injunctive relief moot after transfer | Medical, phone/mail, parole, and state‑law breach claims dismissed (medical and access claims dismissed for failure to allege deliberate indifference or compensable physical injury; standing and mootness grounds applied; state claims dismissed without prejudice to state court) |
Key Cases Cited
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (frivolousness standard for IFP complaints)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions vs. factual allegations in pleadings)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference standard for failure‑to‑protect and medical claims)
- Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states and state agencies are not "persons" under § 1983)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment requires adequate medical care and humane conditions)
- Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (objectively serious risk standard for Eighth Amendment claims)
- Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2005) (§ 1997e(e) bars emotional‑only damages without physical injury)
- Mouille v. City of Live Oak, 977 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1992) (supervisory liability limits under § 1983)
- Pierce v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 37 F.3d 1146 (5th Cir. 1994) (no vicarious liability under § 1983)