580 U.S. 1187
SCOTUS2017Background
- Perez, intoxicated at a beach gathering, made statements to liquor-store employees referencing a “Molotov cocktail” and saying he could “blow the whole place up,” later allegedly saying “I’m going to blow up this whole [expletive] world.”
- Store employees reported the remarks; Perez was charged under Fla. Stat. §790.162 (2007) for threatening to use a destructive device.
- The trial court instructed the jury that a “threat” is a communicated intent as viewed by an ordinary reasonable person, and defined intent circularly as the “stated intent” to do harm or damage.
- The jury convicted Perez; as a habitual offender he received 15 years and 1 day imprisonment.
- Perez challenged the jury instruction (and conviction) arguing it failed to require proof of mens rea consistent with First Amendment protections for speech and doctrinal mens rea rules; the State relied on the instruction and statutory text.
- The Supreme Court denied certiorari; Justice Sotomayor concurred in the denial but expressed that the instruction and conviction raise important First Amendment and intent-standard issues warranting review.
Issues
| Issue | Perez's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury instruction satisfied the required mens rea for a threat conviction | Instruction improperly allowed conviction based solely on what Perez “stated,” not proof of actual intent | Instruction tracked statutory language and permitted conviction based on communicated/"stated" intent | Certiorari denied; lower-court decision left intact |
| Whether the instruction transgressed the First Amendment by not distinguishing true threats from protected speech | Words could be a joke/drunken rambling; First Amendment requires proof the speaker actually intended to threaten | State treated the statements as threatening and relied on jury instruction to govern conviction | Sotomayor concurred: instruction raises serious First Amendment concerns and should be reviewed in an appropriate case |
| What level of intent is required to sustain a threat conviction under the First Amendment | Must require proof the speaker actually intended to communicate a serious intent to commit violence (not just that a reasonable person would view it as a threat) | Reasonable-person or communicated intent standard suffices under statute and instruction | Justice Sotomayor urged clarifying the requisite mens rea; Court did not decide |
| Whether contextual evidence (e.g., intoxication, witnesses who felt no threat) must be considered | Context must be weighed to determine whether an actual threat was intended | Context was for jury but instruction allowed conviction based on the statement alone | Sotomayor noted the trial instruction improperly sidelined context; no Supreme Court ruling issued |
Key Cases Cited
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (per curiam) (expressing doubt that mere threatening words without intent to carry them out are punishable)
- R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (First Amendment does not protect true threats)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (defines “true threat” as a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence and invalidates provisions treating the act itself as prima facie evidence of intent)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (discussed mens rea requirements for criminalizing threatening speech; Court avoided specifying exact intent standard)