Perez v. Cain, 473 P.3d 540

In 2005 Perez (age 14) committed a home invasion and shot two victims; juvenile court waived him to adult court after a waiver study based on Kent criteria and he pleaded guilty to aggravated murder.
He was sentenced to life with possibility of parole (concurrent structure resulting in two life terms with parole eligibility after 30 years/20 consecutive years); direct appeal affirmed in 2007.
Perez filed a counseled post-conviction petition in 2008 raising ineffective-assistance claims but did not challenge the juvenile-court waiver standard; post-conviction relief was largely denied in 2011.
In 2016 this court decided State v. J. C. N.-V., interpreting ORS 419C.349(3) to require inquiry into adult-like mental, social, and emotional development when deciding waiver to adult court.
Perez filed a second post-conviction petition after J. C. N.-V., arguing constitutional defects in the original waiver; the superintendent moved to dismiss as successive and untimely under ORS 138.550(3) and ORS 138.510(3).
The post-conviction court and Court of Appeals dismissed/affirmed; the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding Perez could reasonably have raised the J. C. N.-V.–based claims in his 2008 petition and that his age does not alter the successive-petition analysis because he had counsel then.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Perez)	Defendant's Argument (Cain)	Held
Whether Perez’s J. C. N.-V.–based claims fall within the ORS 138.550(3) escape clause to allow a successive petition	J. C. N.-V. announced a novel, surprising rule not reasonably foreseeable in 2008, so the claims "could not reasonably have been raised" earlier	The interpretive materials and precedent used in J. C. N.-V. were available before 2008; Perez could have raised the issue in his counseled 2008 petition	Held: Claims are barred by ORS 138.550(3); they could reasonably have been raised in 2008
Whether the statute-of-limitations escape clause in ORS 138.510(3) applies to permit the untimely petition	J. C. N.-V. was a later, novel decision that made the claim timely under the escape clause	Same as above: the rule was reasonably anticipatable and thus untimeliness is not excused	Court did not reach on merits because ORS 138.550(3) dispositive; same reasoning applies—escape clause not satisfied
Whether Perez’s youth at the time of his first petition should affect the reasonableness inquiry	Perez (age 17–18 at first petition) contends youth made it harder to comprehend or raise the statutory-interpretation claim	Because Perez was represented by counsel in 2008, the reasonableness inquiry is judged from counsel’s perspective; petitioner’s age is irrelevant	Held: Age does not factor into ORS 138.550(3) analysis when petitioner had counsel; Gutale’s petitioner-focused inquiry does not apply

State v. J. C. N.-V., 359 Or. 559 (2016) (interpreting ORS 419C.349(3) to require inquiry into adult-like mental, social, and emotional development for waiver)
Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or. 553 (2015) (explaining escape-clause reasonableness test and applying it when claim previously raised)
Chavez v. State of Oregon, 364 Or. 654 (2019) (holding novel federal rule Padilla could not reasonably have been raised earlier given preexisting consensus against it)
White v. Premo, 365 Or. 1 (2019) (applying escape-clause analysis to juvenile Eighth Amendment claims post-Miller)
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (juvenile waiver decisions implicate due process; set forth waiver criteria)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (failure to advise clear deportation consequences can be ineffective assistance)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Eighth Amendment requires sentencing to account for juveniles’ diminished culpability)
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013) (discussing the retroactivity and novelty of Padilla)