Perez v. AC Roosevelt Food Corp.
744 F.3d 39
| 2d Cir. | 2013Background
- Perez sued for overtime wages on October 20, 2010; defendants defaulted, class certification was granted, later vacated, and the class was voluntarily decertified before settlement.
- District Court approved a settlement and granted Perez’s motion for attorneys’ fees in an August 13, 2012 order that directed the clerk to close the case.
- Defendants failed to pay; Perez moved to reopen and to have judgment entered; the court granted that motion and a judgment was entered January 7, 2013.
- Defendants filed a notice of appeal on February 6, 2013, challenging only the attorneys’ fees award.
- The Second Circuit addressed whether the August 13 order was a final, appealable order for purposes of the 30-day filing rule and whether the January 7 judgment restarted the appeal period.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of appeal from attorneys’ fees order | Perez: appeal period ran from entry of the August 13 order (fee amount set then); appeal untimely | Defendants: appeal period should run from the January 7 final judgment; appeal timely | Held: Appeal period began on August 13, 2012; January 7 judgment did not restart the 30‑day clock; appeal dismissed as untimely |
| Whether order awarding fees is appealable final order without separate Rule 58 document | Perez: Rule 58(a)(3) excepts fee orders from separate-document requirement, so August 13 order was final | Defendants: the August 13 order was not a Rule 58 judgment and defendants should get 30 days after later judgment | Held: An order setting attorneys’ fees under Rule 54 is excepted from Rule 58(a) and is entered when docketed; it was final on August 13 |
| Whether a later identical judgment restarts the appeal clock | Perez: only a judgment that changes substance or resolves ambiguity restarts the clock | Defendants: judgment entry restarts the 30-day period | Held: A subsequent identical judgment does not restart the time to appeal; only substantive change or ambiguity resolution does |
| Jurisdictional consequence of late filing | Perez: Rule 4 timeliness is jurisdictional and bars untimely appeals | Defendants: (implicit) equitable arguments for measuring from January judgment | Held: Timely filing is jurisdictional in civil cases; court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- M.E.S., Inc. v. Snell, 712 F.3d 666 (2d Cir. 2013) (Rule 4 timeliness is jurisdictional in civil cases)
- Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Purolator Prods. Co., 468 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2006) (fee awards not final until amount set)
- Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2011) (later judgment restarts appeal period only if it changes substance or resolves genuine ambiguity)
- Cody, Inc. v. Town of Woodbury, 179 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (identical second judgment does not permit new appeal period)
- In re Litas Int'l, Inc., 316 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003) (separate-document requirement analysis and limits on relying on self-executing orders)
- Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978) (rationale for separate-document formalism to avoid confusion over when appeal time runs)
- FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206 (1952) (only substantive change in judgment restarts appeal period)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (standard for prevailing party and attorneys’ fee awards)