Perez v. Abbott
267 F. Supp. 3d 750
W.D. Tex.2017Background
- Plan H358 is Texas’s 2013 House redistricting plan; plaintiffs (Task Force, MALC, Perez, NAACP) challenged §2 VRA and Fourteenth Amendment claims, relying in part on prior findings about Plan H283 and interim map H309.
- Legislature made limited post-H309 changes (Dallas, Tarrant, Harris, Webb) and Chairman Darby stated amendment criteria emphasizing population deviation, §2 protection, contiguity, county-line rule, communities of interest, and member agreement.
- The Court previously found intentional discrimination in the 2011 plan (Plan H283) and held the 2013 Legislature purposefully maintained those infirmities where lines remained unchanged or substantially unchanged. The 2013 intent is thus limited to perpetuation of prior defects.
- County-specific contested areas: Harris, Fort Bend, Bell, Dallas, Nueces, Midland/Ector, Bexar, and Tarrant — with differing claims for §2 results, §2 coalition districts, Shaw-type racial gerrymandering, and intentional vote dilution. Remedies were required in Bell, Dallas, Nueces, and Tarrant counties.
- Key factual findings: (1) Nueces County — court found a §2 results violation: two compact HCVAP-majority districts could be drawn wholly within the county but the court declined to require breaking the County Line Rule; (2) Tarrant/HD90 — Shaw-type racial gerrymander established (race predominated to reach a 50% SSVR target) though intentional vote-dilution claim for HD90 failed; (3) Bell and Dallas — prior intentional discrimination persisted and must be remedied; (4) MALC lacks standing in Midland/Ector but has organizational and associational standing for Nueces.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Plan H358 violates §2 by failing to create additional minority (including coalition) opportunity districts in various counties | Plaintiffs: growth and electoral data/demonstration maps show additional compact majority-minority or coalition districts (Harris, Fort Bend, Dallas, Nueces, Midland/Ector) required under Gingles and totality of circumstances | State: §2 does not require coalition districts; plaintiffs failed to prove cohesion; county-line rule and traditional principles defeat some remedies | Court: §2 violation found in Nueces (two compact HCVAP-majority districts possible). §2 claims rejected in Harris, Fort Bend, Dallas for insufficient cohesion. MALC lacks standing in Midland/Ector. |
| Whether the 2013 Legislature acted with discriminatory intent to maintain or further vote dilution from Plan H283 | Plaintiffs: 2013 enactment preserved intentional discrimination (hostility to minority districts; pretextual county-line reliance; refusal to consider coalitions) | State: no new intentional discrimination in 2013; changes were member-driven and race-neutral explanations exist | Court: Legislature intentionally maintained prior discrimination where lines unchanged; 2013 intent limited to perpetuation of existing infirmities. Remedies required in Bell, Dallas, Nueces, and Tarrant. |
| Whether returning Lake Como to HD90 (Tarrant) constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and/or intentional vote dilution | Task Force: HD90 changes were race-based (target SSVR 50.1%); race predominated and significant population moved by race — Shaw and §2 claims | State: changes were member-driven, legitimate (return community), and intent attributable only to staff; SSVR adjustments were to avoid VRA problems | Court: Shaw-type racial gerrymandering established for HD90 (race predominated; strict scrutiny fails). Intentional vote-dilution claim on HD90 failed — primary motive for returning Como was community continuity, not diluting Latino vote. |
| Standing of MALC to assert claims in Nueces and Midland/Ector | MALC: organizational standing (lost member Raul Torres when HD33 eliminated) and associational standing via members (Herrero in Nueces; possible members in West Texas) | State: organizational harm speculative except where membership actually lost; associational standing fails if no member personally injured | Court: MALC has organizational and associational standing in Nueces (Torres elimination and member Herrero). MALC lacks standing in Midland/Ector (no affected MALC member; injury speculative). |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete, traceable, redressable injury)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (associational and organizational standing principles)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (organizational standing when defendant’s conduct perceptibly impairs organization’s activities)
- Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (three preconditions for §2 vote-dilution claims)
- LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (totality of circumstances and proportionality under §2)
- Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (strict scrutiny for racial gerrymandering)
- Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (race-based districting requires strong basis in evidence to satisfy compelling interest)
- Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (organizational standing in voting rights context affirmed by plurality)
- Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (holistic inquiry whether race predominated in district design)