983 F.3d 66
1st Cir.2020Background
- Perez, a USPTO patent examiner, accepted a three‑page settlement agreement allowing him to resign instead of being terminated; the agreement included a release of discrimination claims.
- Perez later filed a disability discrimination suit against the USPTO and its director; defendants moved to dismiss based on the release.
- Perez argued the waiver was unenforceable because a psychiatric disability (depression/anxiety) prevented him from knowingly and voluntarily agreeing; he first raised that diagnosis post‑judgment.
- The record shows Perez had assistance from his union representative (who signed the agreement), was given six days to review, and the agreement adopted the terms Perez requested.
- The district court found Perez’s claim that his psychiatric condition invalidated the waiver to be implausible and dismissed the complaint; Perez appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Perez’s psychiatric condition rendered the waiver not knowing and voluntary | Perez: psychiatric disability impaired his capacity to understand and agree to the release | Defendants: no evidence psychiatric condition affected capacity; Perez read documents, had time and union assistance | Court: Perez waived this theory by failing to plead or explain incapacity; surrounding facts show voluntariness; claim implausible |
| Whether the district court misapplied EEOC guidance on waivers | Perez: court ignored EEOC guidance protecting employees in severance waivers | Defendants: court followed totality‑of‑circumstances approach consistent with EEOC and precedent | Court: analysis comported with EEOC guidance and First Circuit factors |
| Whether filing an administrative discrimination claim after signing shows lack of understanding | Perez: his EEOC/administrative charge indicates he didn’t understand the waiver | Defendants: subsequent filing contradicts knowing breach and cannot void release | Court: post‑release breach doesn’t undermine knowing consent; cannot permit intentional repudiation to void agreement |
| Whether dismissal was proper given the binding release | Perez: release unenforceable for lack of voluntary assent | Defendants: release bars suit | Court: release is binding; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Beddall v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 137 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1998) (documents referenced in a complaint merge into pleadings for Rule 12(b)(6) review)
- Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272 (1st Cir. 2002) (psychiatric disorder alone is insufficient to infer incapacity to execute a release)
- Morais v. Cent. Beverage Corp. Union Emps. Supplemental Ret. Plan, 167 F.3d 709 (1st Cir. 1999) (depression and medication, without more, do not invalidate an agreement)
- Rivera-Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (not all psychiatric disabilities inherently raise capacity‑to‑consent issues)