Peraza v. State
467 S.W.3d 508
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2015Background
- Osmin Peraza pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child; each judgment included a $250 DNA record fee assessed under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.020(a)(1).
- Article 102.020(h) directs that 35% of fees go to the state highway fund and 65% to the criminal justice planning account.
- Peraza argued the fee is an unconstitutional tax that violates the Texas Constitution’s separation of powers by making courts tax collectors for executive-branch programs.
- The First Court of Appeals held the statute facially unconstitutional under Ex Parte Carson, deleting the fee; the Fourteenth Court had earlier upheld the statute, creating a conflict.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether art. 102.020 is facially unconstitutional and whether Carson’s “necessary and incidental to trial” test should control.
- The Court held art. 102.020 is not facially unconstitutional: interconnected statutes restrict use of deposited funds to legitimate criminal-justice purposes (DNA collection, database administration, lab accreditation), so the statute permits constitutional applications.
Issues
| Issue | Peraza's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether art. 102.020 is a tax that violates separation of powers | The DNA fee is an impermissible tax because funds are allocated to executive accounts for uses not "necessary or incidental" to trials | The fee is a legitimate court cost; statutes authorize use for DNA/database purposes and permit constitutional applications | Not facially unconstitutional; Peraza failed to show no possible constitutional application |
| Proper standard for evaluating court-cost statutes | Carson requires costs be "necessary and incidental" to trial; otherwise they are invalid | Carson is too rigid; costs valid if reasonably related to administering the criminal-justice system | Rejects Carson’s strict test; adopts broader standard allowing costs tied to legitimate criminal-justice purposes |
| Whether deposits to the criminal justice planning account are impermissible | Account funds may be used for unrelated projects, so the fee can operate unconstitutionally | Interconnected statutes require the account reimburse DPS and law enforcement for DNA-related costs, so valid applications exist | Funds can be used constitutionally for DNA collection/management; account allocation supports validity |
| Whether deposits to the state highway fund render the fee invalid | TxDOT’s broad access to the highway fund could allow diversion to non-DNA purposes, making the fee a tax | Government Code limits the DNA fee portion in the highway fund to defray DPS DNA/database and lab accreditation costs; specific statutory provisions control | In pari materia and specific provisions limit use to DNA-related purposes; allocation permits constitutional applications |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex Parte Carson, 159 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942) (invalidated a law-library court cost as not a proper cost of criminal litigation)
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (U.S. 1987) (facial-challenge standard: challenger must show no set of circumstances where statute is valid)
- Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (burden on challenger to establish statute’s unconstitutionality)
- Santikos v. State, 836 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (facial attack requires showing statute invalid in all applications)
- State v. Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (discussion of facial-challenge framework)
- Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (court costs intended as recoupment of judicial resource costs)
- State v. Claborn, 870 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (adopted a relaxed test: assessments valid if reasonably related to administering the criminal-justice system)