Peraza, Osmin, PD-0101-15

Background

Appellant Osmin Peraza pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to consecutive 25-year terms; appeals followed and the First Court of Appeals deleted a $250 statutory "DNA record fee" from each judgment.
The fee is authorized by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.020(a)(1) and funds are deposited to the county treasury and, via quarterly remittance, into the state treasury: 35% to the state highway fund and 65% to the Criminal Justice Planning Account (general revenue).
The First Court of Appeals held the fee unconstitutional as a tax not necessary or incidental to a criminal trial and concluded its statutory allocation violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by making courts into tax collectors.
The State sought discretionary review, arguing (1) Ex parte Carson’s test is dicta and should be disavowed in favor of a more deferential standard (Claborn/Oklahoma approach), (2) an invalid court cost is not necessarily a ‘‘tax,’’ and (3) assessing/remitting such fees does not violate separation of powers.
Appellant’s brief defends the First Court of Appeals’ reasoning, relying chiefly on Ex parte Carson and later Texas precedents (Weir, Armstrong, Johnson) that define valid court costs as compensatory recoupment of judicial resources used in the case.

Issues

Issue	Peraza's Argument	State's Argument	Held (First Court of Appeals / position defended by Peraza)
Whether the $250 DNA record fee is a valid court cost	Fee is not "necessary or incidental" to trial; funds support highways and broad grant programs unrelated to a defendant's trial	Fee is a permissible statutory court cost or assessment; Carson test is dicta and should be relaxed	Fee is unconstitutional as a cost; it functions as a tax and was stricken from judgments
Whether Ex parte Carson’s "necessary or incidental to trial" test binds Texas courts	Carson and later cases (Weir, Armstrong, Johnson) supply the controlling test: court costs must recoup judicial-resource expenses	Carson is dicta; Texas should adopt a more lenient, ‘‘reasonably related to criminal justice system’’ standard (Claborn)	First Ct. of Appeals relied on Carson/Weir; Peraza defends those precedents as controlling
Whether an illegitimate court cost is effectively a tax	An invalid court cost that funds general revenue or non-judicial programs is a tax, not a proper court cost	Labeling aside, calling it a fee avoids the ‘‘tax’’ characterization; some prior authorities are ambiguous	Court of Appeals treated the fee as a tax because proceeds flow to non-judicial uses
Whether assessing/collecting the fee violates separation of powers	Requiring courts to assess/collect revenue destined for executive-controlled funds improperly makes courts tax-gatherers, usurping executive functions	Collection/recording duties are ministerial; similar remittances (e.g., sales taxes) don’t render private parties or courts improper collectors	Court of Appeals concluded the scheme violated separation of powers when the fee operates as a tax and funds non-judicial programs

Key Cases Cited

Ex parte Carson, 159 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942) (court costs must be "necessary or incidental to the trial" to be legitimate)
Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (court costs are nonpunitive recoupment of judicial resources expended in connection with the trial)
Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (reaffirming Weir’s compensatory/recoupment view of court costs)
Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (restating that court costs are not part of punishment but are recoupment of judicial-resource costs)
LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1986) (civil filing fees deposited to general revenue can constitute an unconstitutional revenue tax on the right to litigate)
State v. Claborn, 870 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (adopting a more relaxed ‘‘reasonably related to administering the criminal justice system’’ standard for assessments)