Pepper v. United States
131 S. Ct. 1229
| SCOTUS | 2011Background
- Pepper was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, with a guideline range of 97–121 months.
- Initial district court sentence granted a 40% departure for substantial assistance, plus a 59% variance for rehabilitation, totaling 24 months.
- Eighth Circuit reversed in Pepper II, remanding for resentencing in light of Booker and other issues.
- On remand, Pepper presented extensive post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence (education, employment, family stability) and ongoing compliance with release conditions.
- District Court again sentenced Pepper to 24 months, but the Court of Appeals held post-sentencing rehabilitation could not be considered for a downward variance.
- Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated part of the Eighth Circuit decision, and held that post-sentencing rehabilitation may be considered at resentencing and may support a downward variance; law-of-the-case issues on the 40% departure were resolved differently.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May post-sentencing rehabilitation be considered at resentencing after revocation on appeal? | Pepper; Pepper contends rehabilitation is relevant to history and characteristics and future conduct. | US and Pepper II; the court held post-sentencing rehab is impermissible under §5K2.19 and similar constraints. | Yes; post-sentencing rehabilitation may be considered and can support a downward variance. |
| Should the same percentage departure for substantial assistance govern after remand (law of the case)? | Pepper II/III argued law of the case required 40% departure. | District court could reconsider departures on remand; no fixed percentage binding. | No; law of the case did not require the same 40% departure on remand. |
| Is § 3742(g)(2) constitutional after Booker as to resentencing discretion? | Amicus argued § 3742(g)(2) precludes post-sentencing rehab-based variances by effectively mandating guidelines. | Government argues continued validity of § 3742(g)(2) as a ground for departure upon remand. | Unconstitutional; § 3742(g)(2) invalidated; resentencing may use non-Guidelines considerations. |
| Does § 3553(a) permit consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation despite Guideline policy statements? | Pepper argues rehabilitation informs history, deterrence, and treatment needs. | Amicus argues policy statements in USSG §5K2.19 prohibit consideration of post-sentencing rehab. | Yes; §3553(a) factors permit consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation where appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (Supreme Court, 1949) (wide discretion in evidence for sentencing; life and characteristics inform justice)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (Supreme Court, 2005) (Guidelines advisory, Sixth Amendment remedy; framework for resentencing)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (Supreme Court, 2007) (reasonableness review of sentences within statutory limits)
- Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (Supreme Court, 2007) (courts may vary from advisory Guidelines based on § 3553(a) considerations)
- Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (Supreme Court, 1984) (broad discretion in sources and types of evidence at sentencing)
- United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (Supreme Court, 1972) (broad discretion in information considered for sentence)
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (Supreme Court, 1969) (double jeopardy safeguards; relevance to sentencing reconsiderations)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (Supreme Court, 2007) (reasonable appellate review of sentencing within advisory framework)