2014 COA 169
Colo. Ct. App.2014Background
- Robert J. Young was convicted in 1988 of kidnapping and sexual assault after a police officer and the victim identified him at the scene; semen was found on the victim's underwear and serology testing then did not exclude him.
- Young sought postconviction DNA testing under Colorado's postconviction DNA statutes; multiple postconviction courts held hearings, appointed counsel, and ultimately ordered testing by the Denver Crime Laboratory (DCL) in 2007.
- DCL testing in 2007 found no semen/saliva yielding a usable profile from crotch cuttings; two cuttings produced no or inconclusive nuclear DNA results; analyst did not test waistband/leg areas for "touch DNA."
- Young later obtained court permission for independent testing, but when he sought the garment in 2010 it could not be located and was likely destroyed in October 2009 by the Denver Property Bureau.
- Young moved for relief under § 18-1-414(2)(b) (remedies for negligent destruction of preserved biological evidence) and § 18-1-1104 (courts to determine due process violations when statutorily preserved DNA evidence cannot be produced). The postconviction court denied relief, finding no due process violation and that Young had not shown testing would establish actual innocence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Young) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether Young is entitled to a remedy under § 18-1-414(2)(b) for negligent destruction of preserved biological evidence | The State argued prior courts had not made statutory findings required for DNA testing under § 18-1-413 and that Young could not show testing would demonstrate actual innocence. | Young argued courts had effectively ordered/authorized testing and the later destruction of the underwear before independent testing entitled him to relief under § 18-1-414(2)(b). | Court held no error: later court could revisit earlier orders, prior courts had not made § 18-1-413 findings, and Young failed to show by preponderance that favorable DNA would demonstrate actual innocence; denied relief. |
| 2) Whether the destruction violated Young's due process rights under § 18-1-1104(4) / constitutional due process tests | The State maintained the garment, after 2007 testing, had no apparent exculpatory value and destruction was negligent, not in bad faith. | Young contended that touch DNA on waistband/legs could have exculpated him and that statutory preservation duties were violated. | Court held no due process violation: defendant could not show the evidence had apparent exculpatory value at the time of destruction and there was no bad faith; denied relief. |
| 3) Whether prior postconviction courts implicitly satisfied § 18-1-413 prerequisites such that destruction before Young’s independent testing warrants remedy | The State argued prior orders did not satisfy § 18-1-413 and that appointment of counsel or orders based on CJRA did not equate to statutory findings. | Young argued the appointment of counsel, hearings, and previous testing orders implicitly met § 18-1-413 requirements permitting relief. | Court held prior courts made no implicit § 18-1-413 findings; appointment/hearings did not equal statutory findings; revisiting prior orders was appropriate. |
| 4) Whether § 18-1-414(2)(b) even applies when some testing occurred before destruction | The State noted the statute targets destruction before testing; testing had occurred at DCL in 2007. | Young asserted destruction foreclosed his authorized independent testing, so the statute should apply. | Court assumed (without deciding) § 18-1-414(2)(b) could apply post-testing but concluded Young failed the substantive § 18-1-413/actual innocence showing, so no relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Abdu, 215 P.3d 1265 (Colo. App. 2009) (standard for reviewing postconviction DNA-preservation and due process issues)
- People v. Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167 (Colo. 2001) (three-part test for due process claim when evidence destroyed)
- People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334 (Colo. 1987) (destruction or suppression of evidence and due process framework)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (U.S. 1988) (negligent destruction of potentially useful evidence does not per se violate due process absent bad faith)
- People v. Wyman, 788 P.2d 1278 (Colo. 1990) (state need not preserve evidence of which nothing more can be said than it could have been subjected to tests)
- People v. Warren, 55 P.3d 809 (Colo. App. 2002) (law of the case and reconsideration of prior rulings)