People v. Young, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192

Background

In 1999 Young participated in an armed robbery of a Five Star parking lot; two employees (Teresa Perez, Jack Reynolds) were shot in the back of the head and killed; other victims were shot at and a car was carjacked. Young was tried, convicted of two first‑degree murders, attempted murder, and carjacking; special‑circumstance findings were true. Guilt verdicts affirmed.
During a recorded pre‑arrest phone call Young admitted participating in the robbery and said “I was the first one that fired.” Police later played part of that recording for Young, gave Miranda warnings, and Young said post‑warning, “You heard it all,” then invoked counsel.
At guilt phase the court admitted photographs of Young’s racist tattoos (e.g., a Thor’s hammer and a tattoo reading “Nigger Thrasher”) and testimony about skinhead affiliations for identification and consciousness‑of‑guilt purposes; Young’s guilt convictions were upheld as any error was harmless given the recorded confession.
The first penalty jury deadlocked; pursuant to Penal Code §190.4(b) Young had a mandatory penalty retrial. At retrial the defense presented family/character mitigation; the prosecution was permitted to rebut with extensive evidence of Young’s white‑supremacist beliefs, numerous racist tattoos, expert testimony decoding symbols, and prison gang‑related evidence.
The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred at the penalty retrial by allowing the prosecution to admit and emphasize Young’s racist beliefs and tattoos as general bad character (i.e., to show who he was morally), rather than limiting such evidence to proper purposes (e.g., evidence of violent conduct, consciousness of guilt, or rebuttal narrowly tied to the specific trait the defense asserted). The death sentence was reversed and remanded for a new penalty determination.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Young)	Held
Admissibility of post‑Miranda statement (“You heard it all”)	Statement is an adoptive admission that bolsters the recorded confession; it was given after proper Miranda warnings and thus admissible.	The pre‑warning interview and “softening‑up” tactics rendered any post‑warning remark involuntary or tainted by a two‑step Seibert technique; suppression required.	Court: No reversible Miranda error; even assuming error, admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the tape confession itself was decisive and unchallenged.
Admission of racist tattoos/associations at guilt phase	Tattoos were relevant to witness identification and red laces showed consciousness of guilt; probative value outweighed prejudice.	Evidence was inflammatory, irrelevant to motive, and unfairly prejudicial under Evid. Code §352.	Court: Admission was not reversible error; tattoos and red laces were relevant and any prejudice was harmless given overwhelming guilt evidence.
Admission/use of racist beliefs and tattoos at penalty retrial (rebuttal to mitigation)	Rebuttal to defendant’s character/mitigation permitted; tattoos, writings, and affiliations showed who defendant was and could rebut his claimed good character or show dangerousness.	Beliefs are abstract, First Amendment‑protected, and irrelevant to penalty unless tightly linked to an issue (e.g., motive or violent propensity); using them as general bad character was unconstitutional and unduly inflammatory.	Court: Much of the evidence was improperly used as general character proof of reprehensible beliefs (beyond permissible rebuttal or violence‑propensity uses); error violated Dawson principles and was prejudicial. Death sentence vacated; new penalty trial ordered.
Mandatory penalty retrial following deadlock	Retrial is proper under Pen. Code §190.4(b); not constitutionally infirm; prosecution may present rebuttal.	Mandatory retrial violates Eighth Amendment evolving‑standards and devalues jury moral judgment; retrial gave prosecution unfair advantage.	Court: Reaffirmed precedent upholding mandatory retrial; no constitutional violation and no abuse as to retrial procedure itself. But prosecutorial use of racist belief evidence at retrial was reversible error.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and custodial interrogation rules)
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (post‑warning confession admissible if subsequent waiver is voluntary despite earlier unwarned statement)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (Miranda’s interrogation includes words or actions police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (two‑step interrogation can render post‑warning statement inadmissible in calculated cases)
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (First Amendment limits admission of defendant’s beliefs/associations at sentencing unless evidence is relevant to a legitimate sentencing issue)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless error standard: reversal required only if error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
People v. Williams, 49 Cal.4th 405 (Cal. 2010) (standards for voluntariness and Miranda waiver analysis)
People v. Powell, 5 Cal.5th 921 (Cal. 2018) (discussion of gang/tattoo evidence relevance and penalty‑phase limits)