People v. Young
C077483
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 17, 2017Background
- Defendant Shawn D. Young was convicted by jury of multiple sexual offenses against his daughters A. (then 4) and H. (then 3) and a neighbor child M. (then 5); sentence included an aggregate determinate term plus an indeterminate 85 years to life.
- Allegations arose after M.’s mother learned A. tried to put her finger in M.’s vagina; A. and H. then disclosed multiple incidents of touching, insertion of objects, and intercourse/penetration dating to Texas and to the family’s move to California in May 2013.
- Forensic interviews and trial testimony included inconsistent and some fantastical statements (e.g., stuffed animals in vagina), but also repeated reports of fingers, carrots, and penis contact.
- On the morning prosecution was to begin, defendant’s regular counsel was ill; a stand-in from the public defender’s office (O’Connor) agreed to a one-day continuance but had no case familiarity. The court excused two jurors (one for surgery, Juror No. 12; the other, Juror No. 4, for tardiness) and seated alternates while defendant and his regular counsel were absent.
- The Court of Appeal found: (1) removal of Juror No. 4 without an adequate on-the-record inquiry and outside the presence of defendant and effective counsel was an abuse of discretion and violated the right to counsel at critical stages; (2) the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring reversal of the judgment; (3) sufficiency review: conviction on Count 3 (sexual intercourse with H.) is supported by substantial evidence, but Count 6 (continuous sexual abuse of H. over 3+ months) is unsupported and must be reversed with bar to retrial on that count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Young) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Removal of Juror No. 4 without defendant or regular counsel present | Trial court reasonably excused a tardy juror after clerk/bailiff attempts to contact him; substitution with alternate harmless | Removal occurred without a sufficient on-the-record inquiry, outside defendant’s presence and without effective counsel; violated right to counsel and presence | Reversed: removal was an abuse of discretion and violated right to counsel at a critical stage; error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Forfeiture of claim for failure to object later | Defense counsel failed to object when she returned; issue forfeited | Neither defendant nor regular counsel was present at removal; stand-in had no case familiarity so failure to object should not constitute forfeiture | Court exercised discretion to reach the claim on the merits despite forfeiture arguments |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Count 3 (sexual intercourse with H. in CA) | Statements in H.’s forensic interview plus corroborating pattern of abuse provide sufficient evidence | H.’s interview contained fantastical and interviewer-suggested elements; unreliable to prove intercourse in CA | Held: Substantial evidence supports Count 3 (conviction may be retried) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Count 6 (continuous sexual abuse requiring 3+ months) | Charging period (May 1–July 31, 2013) allowed jury to infer 3+ months elapsed | No evidence establishing the abuse in California spanned at least 90 days; dates too speculative | Held: Insufficient evidence for continuous-sex-abuse element; conviction reversed and may not be retried on Count 6 |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Mendes, 23 Cal.3d 847 (Cal. 1979) (trial court must hold an appropriate hearing in presence of litigants and counsel unless facts clearly establish good cause to remove juror)
- Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (U.S. 1983) (ex parte contacts or exclusion of defendant/counsel implicate constitutional rights but are subject to harmless-error review)
- People v. Dell, 232 Cal.App.3d 248 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (juror substitution is not always a critical stage; presence of counsel may be unnecessary where good cause is clear)
- People v. Mejia, 155 Cal.App.4th 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (continuous sexual abuse conviction requires substantial evidence that at least three months elapsed between first and last qualifying acts)
- People v. Bell, 61 Cal.App.4th 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (court may remove a juror for inability to return when inquiry shows juror cannot commit to return and judicial economy justifies substitution)