500 P.3d 267
Cal.2021Background
- Defendant William Lee Wright Jr. was convicted of first-degree murder (Philip Curtis), with robbery and burglary special circumstances, plus four attempted murders and a robbery; the jury returned a death sentence in 2002 and the appeal was automatic.
- Two violent incidents: (1) Feb. 17, 2000 Long Beach — Wright entered an apartment, stabbed Douglas Priest and shot Julius Martin; Priest and Martin later identified Wright; (2) Mar. 21, 2000 Pomona — Wright bought drugs, returned, shots were fired; Phillip Curtis died, Mario Ralph and Willie Alexander were shot; Ralph and Alexander later identified Wright.
- Ballistics linked .32-caliber bullets recovered at the Pomona scene, from Curtis’s body, and a bullet fragment from the Long Beach scene to a dark .32 revolver found in an Ontario apartment where Wright was arrested shortly after the Pomona incident.
- Defense raised identity and credibility challenges (including recantation or equivocation by Alexander); prosecution presented eyewitness identification and ballistics as primary proofs of guilt.
- Pretrial and trial counsel issues: Wright sought to represent himself two days before trial (Faretta motion) and moved to substitute counsel (Marsden); both motions were denied by the trial court.
- The California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death judgment in full, rejecting Wright’s claims of Faretta/Marsden error, prosecutorial misconduct, improper evidentiary rulings, instructional errors, and death-penalty constitutional challenges.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Wright’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of Faretta self-representation | Motion untimely on eve of trial; denial was within trial court discretion to prevent disruption | Request made two days before trial but was timely under Lynch totality-of-circumstances; denial violated Faretta | Faretta motion untimely; trial court did not abuse discretion in denying self-representation (Windham/Lynch analysis) |
| Denial of Marsden motion to substitute counsel | Counsel’s performance was competent; Marsden hearing adequate | Counsel failed to pursue alleged exculpatory witness (girlfriend) and performance was constitutionally deficient | Marsden hearing adequate; tactical disagreements do not require substitution; no abuse of discretion |
| Prosecutorial questioning about ex-wife seeing Wright point a gun | Evidence that Wright possessed the gun was relevant to identity; stray question harmless | Question violated court ruling and was prejudicial | Forfeited (no curative instruction requested) and in any event harmless given substantial ballistics and ID evidence |
| Prosecutor’s hypothetical suggesting incarceration when questioning gang expert | Question was responsive and permissible scope-rehabilitation after cross | Improper attempt to insinuate incarceration/prior custody | Brief hypothetical was improper but harmless in context of overwhelming evidence |
| Prosecutorial vouching (introducing witness to prosecutor’s daughter) & mistrial motion | Question about contacts/recollection of conversations was allowable to rehabilitate witness | Comment bolstered witness credibility via prosecutor’s personal relationship; mistrial required | No prejudice shown; denial of mistrial not an abuse of discretion |
| Admission of expert testimony about rarity of lifting prints from firearms (negative fingerprint evidence) | Anticipatory rebuttal of juror expectations about fingerprints; relevant to forestall speculation | Irrelevant and prejudicial because no fingerprint evidence was introduced | Admission within trial court’s discretion; relevant to jury expectations and nonprejudicial |
| Circumstantial evidence instruction selection (CALJIC No. 2.02 vs 2.01) & eyewitness identification instruction (certainty factor) | Court could use CALJIC No. 2.02 because case rested mainly on eyewitness ID; CALJIC No. 2.92 (certainty) is permissible in context | Circumstantial evidence was substantial so CALJIC No. 2.01 was required; certainty is an unreliable factor | Court properly gave CALJIC No. 2.02 (circumstantial evidence corroborative of direct ID); CALJIC No. 2.92 did not violate due process in context of instructions as whole |
| Felony-murder / first-degree murder instruction though information charged murder generally | Information alleged robbery/burglary special circumstances putting defendant on notice of felony-murder theory | Information charged only section 187 generally; instruction on first-degree murder exceeded charging document | Instruction on first-degree felony murder proper; special-circumstance allegations provided adequate notice |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognizes constitutional right to self-representation)
- Windham v. People, 19 Cal.3d 121 (1977) (trial court discretion when Faretta motion untimely)
- People v. Lynch, 50 Cal.4th 693 (2010) (timeliness of Faretta motion judged on totality of circumstances)
- People v. Frierson, 53 Cal.3d 730 (1991) (Faretta motion two days before trial held on "eve of trial")
- People v. Johnson, 8 Cal.5th 475 (2019) (timeliness standards for Faretta motions)
- People v. Rogers, 39 Cal.4th 826 (2006) (when CALJIC No. 2.01 required vs. 2.02)
- People v. McKinnon, 52 Cal.4th 610 (2011) (circumstantial evidence incidental/corroborative of direct evidence)
- People v. Lemcke, 11 Cal.5th 644 (2021) (eyewitness certainty instruction and due process)
- People v. Brasure, 42 Cal.4th 1037 (2008) (circumstantial evidence instruction consistent with beyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule)
- People v. Bolden, 29 Cal.4th 515 (2002) (brief references to custody or parole not necessarily prejudicial)