People v. Woosley, 2020 IL App (3d) 170307

Jordan Woosley was charged with home invasion and armed robbery; later an amended information added two robbery counts and accountability theories.
Woosley had successive counsel changes; the State’s motion for a fitness evaluation was denied after a hearing.
On July 10, 2015, defense counsel appeared by telephone for a scheduled hearing on the State’s motion to continue because she was unavailable in person.
During that hearing Woosley requested to proceed pro se; while that request was being discussed the prosecutor sought to file a second amended information (not previously disclosed) and left to retrieve it.
Counsel—on a speakerphone in the courtroom with no opportunity for private consultation—was discharged after Woosley executed a written waiver and entered an Alford plea to one robbery count.
Woosley later moved to withdraw the plea (denied), appealed, and argued on appeal that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because counsel participated only by telephone during the critical hearing when self-representation and an amended information were addressed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Woosley was denied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when appointed counsel participated by telephone during the hearing in which Woosley sought to proceed pro se and an amended information was filed	The hearing began as a noncritical motion-to-continue hearing; telephone participation was adequate and no deprivation occurred	Telephone presence on speaker prevented confidential consultation, impeded counsel’s ability to assess fitness to waive counsel, and denied effective assistance at a critical stage	Court held error occurred: phone-only participation without private consultation denied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and reversed and remanded
Whether the unpreserved claim warrants review under plain-error (second-prong) doctrine	Any error was not sufficiently serious to affect fairness	Denial of counsel is structural and so is presumptively prejudicial under second-prong plain-error review	Court applied second-prong plain error, treating the denial as structural error and presumptively prejudicial; reversal and remand ordered

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (recognition that average defendant lacks legal skill to protect rights without counsel)
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (counsel required at stages where substantial rights may be affected)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (arraignment is a critical stage)
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (denial of counsel is structural error)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (right to counsel is fundamental)
People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551 (plain-error doctrine framework)
People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (presumption of prejudice for serious errors under second-prong)
People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1 (right to counsel at critical stages)
People v. Abernathy, 399 Ill. App. 3d 420 (de novo review of right-to-counsel claims)