People v. Wilson
245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 256
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2019Background
- Defendant was tried twice for 12 counts of forcible lewd acts on a child (Pen. Code § 288(b)(1)) and one count of continuous sexual abuse (§ 288.5(a)); first trial hung, second resulted in convictions on all counts and findings of substantial sexual contact; court later dismissed the § 288.5 count as duplicative at sentencing.
- Prosecution presented testimony from the defendant’s former wife (Nicole C.) and her son (J.D.) about prior sexual assaults; these prior-act witnesses were admitted under Evidence Code § 1108.
- Two alleged victims at issue: J.D. (former stepson) who testified about anal rape in Kansas when age 4–5, and L.D. (girlfriend’s daughter) who testified to repeated oral, digital, and penile assaults from about age 9 into adolescence.
- Prosecution expert Dr. Anthony Urquiza testified about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) and, briefly, statistical studies saying false allegations of child sexual abuse are rare (roughly 1–6%).
- Defense presented Dr. Lee Coleman to rebut CSAAS and to challenge the statistical reliability of false‑allegation prevalence; defendant also testified and denied the charged conduct.
- The Court of Appeal (published portion) held the admission of the expert’s statistical testimony was an abuse of discretion and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the § 288.5 charge was an alternative to the § 288 counts; but it affirmed the convictions as the errors were harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of expert statistical testimony that false allegations are rare | Such background statistics assist jurors in understanding CSAAS and the general prevalence of false reports | Testimony improperly bolstered complainants’ credibility and invaded the jury’s province by implying a high probability complainants were truthful | Court: Admission of the percentages was an abuse of discretion; statistical evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial, but error was harmless under Watson standard |
| Failure to instruct jury that § 288.5 was an alternative to specific § 288 counts | Prosecutor proceeded on specific counts; court can vacate duplicative conviction later | Defendant: Jury should have been instructed not to convict on both theories; dual convictions improper | Court: Trial court erred by not instructing; dual convictions improper in principle, but convictions for specific lewd acts (counts 1–12) were most commensurate with culpability and vacating § 288.5 was appropriate; no reversal |
| Admissibility of prior sexual‑offense testimony under Evid. Code § 1108 (Nicole C., J.D.) | Evidence of prior sexual misconduct is admissible to prove propensity in criminal sexual cases per § 1108 | Defendant: Prior‑acts testimony was prejudicial and improperly admitted | Court: In unpublished portion, rejected most challenges to § 1108 evidence except one not sustained on outcome; convictions affirmed |
| Admission/exclusion of expert testimony on CSAAS and false allegations (other expert testimony/medical testimony) | Prosecution: CSAAS expert testimony explains common victim behaviors; statistical comments were part of that context | Defense: CSAAS should not be offered as proof of abuse and statistical statements usurp jury role; defense expert testimony was improperly limited | Court: CSAAS testimony admissible, but the prosecutor‑elicited statistical prevalence evidence was improper; other claimed errors mostly rejected and harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Johnson, 28 Cal.4th 240 (2002) (continuous sexual abuse and specific sexual offense convictions covering same period cannot both stand; one must be vacated)
- People v. Torres, 102 Cal.App.4th 1053 (2002) (remedy for § 288.5(c) violation is to leave convictions that are most commensurate with culpability)
- People v. Melton, 44 Cal.3d 713 (1988) (fact‑finder must draw ultimate inferences; expert testimony should not usurp jury credibility determinations)
- People v. Collins, 68 Cal.2d 319 (1968) (rejecting "trial by mathematics" and inadmissible statistical evidence that distorts jury role)
- Powell v. State, 527 A.2d 276 (Del. 1987) (expert testimony that expresses statistical certitude that complainants tell the truth impermissibly bolsters credibility)
- Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 1998) (expert testimony quantifying how many children in expert’s sample "told the truth" held improper as credibility‑boosting)