People v. Wilson
2016 IL App (1st) 141500
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- In Sept. 2012, then-17-year-old Drashun Wilson was filmed shooting into an alley near 59th & Wabash; a bystander (Fulton) was shot and suffered severe facial and sinus fractures. Wilson was identified in surveillance and a show-up; gunshot residue and a statement implicating him were introduced at trial.
- Wilson was convicted by a jury of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm; the aggravated-battery count merged into the attempted-murder conviction.
- Because Wilson personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily harm, he faced a 25-year-to-life firearm enhancement under 720 ILCS 5/8-4 and an applicable Class X base term; he received the mandatory minimum aggregate sentence of 31 years with 85% truth-in-sentencing.
- While his direct appeal was pending, the legislature enacted Public Act 99-69 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), requiring sentencing courts to consider enumerated youth-related mitigating factors for offenders who committed offenses while under 18 and permitting discretionary refusal of certain firearm enhancements for such offenders when the offense was committed on or after the act’s effective date.
- On appeal Wilson argued (1) Public Act 99-69 should be applied retroactively to require resentencing; (2) the Illinois exclusive-jurisdiction statute that routed him to adult court violated the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement and truth-in-sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment and the Illinois proportionate-penalties clause.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Wilson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Public Act 99-69 applies retroactively to defendants sentenced before its effective date but whose appeals were pending | Statute’s plain language is prospective: effective date and present-tense “commits” show it applies to offenses committed on or after Jan. 1, 2016 | The statute lacks temporal restrictions and should apply at any sentencing hearing on or after its effective date, even for offenses committed earlier | Court held the statute is prospective only and does not apply to Wilson’s offense/sentence |
| Whether the exclusive-jurisdiction provision (which routed 17-year-old felons to adult court) violates the Eighth Amendment under Roper/Graham/Miller | The statute is procedural (specifies forum), not a sentencing statute; it does not itself impose punishment and is presumptively constitutional | The automatic adult prosecution for 17-year-olds precluded consideration of youth and thus violated Eighth Amendment principles from Roper, Graham, Miller | Court held the exclusive-jurisdiction provision did not violate the Eighth Amendment; Patterson/Harmon reasoning controls |
| Whether the mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement and truth-in-sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment for juvenile offender | Mandatory enhancements and truth-in-sentencing are authorized by the legislature; Miller’s ban on mandatory life without parole for juveniles is limited and does not extend to long mandatory term-of-years sentences | Application of the enhancement and 85% requirement to a 17-year-old produced an unconstitutionally severe sentence under Eighth Amendment | Court held Eighth Amendment claim failed: Miller is limited to mandatory life-without-parole; Wilson’s 31-year term was not an LWOP and the sentence was constitutional |
| Whether the sentence violated the Illinois proportionate-penalties clause | Legislature may prescribe mandatory penalties; firearm enhancements are constitutionally permissible and do not shock the moral sense given risks firearms create | Wilson’s youth, lack of prior record, peer pressure, and mitigating circumstances render the 31-year (with enhancement) sentence grossly disproportionate | Court held the sentence did not violate the proportionate-penalties clause given facts, precedent, and sentencing court’s exercise of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty for offenders under 18 is unconstitutional; juveniles have diminished culpability)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violates Eighth Amendment)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional because it precludes consideration of youth)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (framework for retroactivity analysis of statutes)
- People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102 (Illinois Supreme Court: transfer/automatic-adult-prosecution statutes are forum provisions, not sentencing statutes; Miller’s reach limited)
- People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481 (2005) (firearm enhancement does not violate proportionate-penalties clause given increased risk firearms pose)
- People v. Miller (Leon Miller), 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002) (legislature may prescribe mandatory sentences but penalties must satisfy constitutional limits)
- Hayashi v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Reg., 2014 IL 116023 (Illinois Supreme Court adopting Landgraf approach to statutory temporal reach)