People v. Williams
57 Cal.App.5th 652
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2020Background
- Defendant Jeremiah Williams was convicted by a jury of multiple violent felonies (robbery, multiple counts of forcible rape and other sexual offenses, criminal threats, burglary, assault, false imprisonment) arising from separate attacks on two victims; DNA and physical evidence linked him to both crimes.
- During jury selection Williams repeatedly sought new counsel (Marsden motions), threatened disruptive behavior, and on the third Marsden outburst spoke to jurors as they entered; the court warned him and then removed him from the courtroom for disruptive conduct.
- The court empaneled the jury, continued the trial in Williams’s absence under Penal Code §1043, and Williams thereafter elected to remain in custody and not attend trial or sentencing.
- Williams’s counsel moved for mistrial immediately after removal; the court denied the motion and repeatedly instructed the jurors not to consider the defendant’s absence or courtroom conduct.
- At sentencing the court imposed a lengthy aggregate term (100 years to life + 86 years 2 months) and various fines, fees, and assessments, including a $10,000 restitution fine; Williams raised issues on appeal including removal, Faretta/self-representation, mistrial, mental-health diversion eligibility, equal protection re: youth-parole carve-out, and ability-to-pay for fines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Removal under §1043 (presence requirement) | People: court had authority to remove Williams because trial had commenced in his presence and he engaged in disruptive conduct after warning. | Williams: court lacked authority because trial had not "commenced in his presence" when removed; §1043(b) therefore inapplicable. | Affirmed. Under People v. Johnson and the record (jury empaneled, Marsden denied), trial had commenced in his presence; substantial evidence supports disruptive conduct and voluntary absence. |
| Denial of Faretta/self-representation | People: request was untimely, equivocal, and made in anger to obtain new counsel; denying Faretta was proper to avoid delay. | Williams: he requested to represent himself and the court erred in refusing. | Affirmed. Request was equivocal/ambivalent and untimely; court properly exercised discretion to deny. |
| Denial of mistrial after courtroom outburst | People: prompt admonitions cured any prejudice; defendant invited error by his own misconduct. | Williams: removal and statements prejudiced jury; mistrial or dismissal of venire required. | Affirmed. Outburst was isolated, court promptly instructed jurors to disregard absence/conduct; no incurable prejudice shown. |
| Mental-health diversion (§1001.36) | People: amended statute excludes sex registrants and rape offenders; amendment is not ex post facto because it does not increase punishment or alter legal consequences retroactively in a forbidden way. | Williams: should be remanded to consider diversion under original June 2018 enactment; applying amendment violated ex post facto/due process. | Affirmed. Williams was statutorily ineligible after amendment; amendment did not violate ex post facto or due process. |
| Equal protection re: §3051 youth-parole carve-out (one-strike exclusion) | People: Legislature had rational basis—public safety/recidivism concerns (sex-offender statutes, registration, civil commitment schemes) justify treating one-strike sex offenders differently. | Williams: excluding one-strike offenders from youth-parole hearings denies equal protection compared to other offenders (e.g., murderers). | Affirmed. Rational-basis review applies; risk of recidivism and related statutory schemes provide a conceivable legitimate purpose for the carve-out. |
| Imposition of fines/assessments without ability-to-pay hearing | Williams: Dueñas requires an ability-to-pay hearing before imposing certain assessments and executing restitution fines. | People: defendant forfeited objection by not raising inability-to-pay at sentencing; even if not forfeited, lengthy sentence and prison wages demonstrate ability to pay. | Affirmed. Williams forfeited on appeal; court alternatively found defendant able to pay over time via prison wages. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Johnson, 6 Cal.5th 541 (Cal. 2018) (trial "commenced in his presence" may begin at jury selection; supports removal under §1043)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (defendant has right to self-representation if timely, unequivocal, knowing)
- People v. Marshall, 15 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 1997) (court must assess whether defendant truly desires to represent self; draw inferences against waiver)
- People v. Lucero, 44 Cal.3d 1006 (Cal. 1988) (isolated courtroom outbursts can be cured by prompt admonition; mistrial not required)
- People v. Espinoza, 1 Cal.5th 61 (Cal. 2016) (voluntary absence standard and substantial-evidence review of §1043 removals)
- People v. Concepcion, 45 Cal.4th 77 (Cal. 2008) (discusses commencement of trial and related principles)
- People v. Contreras, 4 Cal.5th 349 (Cal. 2018) (juvenile LWOP Eighth Amendment analysis; distinguishes juvenile-sentencing contexts)
- People v. Bell, 3 Cal.App.5th 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (upheld rational basis for excluding certain sex-offense offenders from youth-parole eligibility)
- People v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (held ability-to-pay hearing required before imposing some assessments and executing restitution fines)